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ABSTRACT
The question we address in this paper is why the Japanese miracle didn't take place until after World
War II. For much of the pre-WWII period, Japan's real GNP per worker was not much more than a
third of that of the U.S., with falling capital intensity. We argue that its major cause is a barrier that
kept agricultural employment constant at about 14 million throughout the prewar period. In our two-
sector neoclassical growth model, the barrier-induced sectoral mis-allocation of labor and a resulting
disincentive for capital accumulation account well for the depressed output level. Were it not for the
barrier, Japan's prewar GNP per worker would have been close to a half of the U.S. The labor barrier
existed because, we argue, the prewar patriarchy, armed with paternalistic clauses in the prewar Civil













The Japanese miracle, which lifted the Japanese economy from the ashes of the World War II destruction
to the present-day prosperity, and the “lost decade” of the 1990s, during which the economy ceased to
grow, are well known. Much less so is the decades-long stagnation before World War II: for much of the
prewar period of 1885-1940, Japan’s real GNP per worker remained a third of that of the U.S. This paper
addresses the question of why the Japanese miracle didn’t occur before the war.
An amazing fact about agricultural employment in prewar Japan is that it was virtually constant
at 14 million persons (about 64% of total employment in 1885) throughout the entire prewar period,
despite a very large urban-rural income disparity. There was a persistent and signiﬁcant rural-to-urban
emigration, but its size was never large enough to diminish rural population. The constancy strongly
suggests that there was a powerful non-economic force that prevented people from moving out of
agriculture and that the 14 million was a binding lower bound for agricultural employment.
This leads us to ask whether a possible sectoral mis-allocation of labor due to this barrier to labor
mobility had a quantitatively important eect on the economic development of prewar Japan. We do so
by a two-sector neoclassical growth model with agriculture. Our two-sector model builds on the long
tradition of modeling the “dual economy” starting with Jorgenson (1961).1 Its most recent renditions
are Echeverria (1997), Robertson (1999), Laitner (2000), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), and others.
They examine the interaction of Engel’s Law and the dynamics of capital accumulation, which also is a
focus of our paper.
Our paper is also related to the recent development accounting literature on international income
dierences, although our focus is exclusively on Japan in relation to the U.S.2 Vollrath (2005) ﬁnds for a
number of countries that the sectoral allocation of labor and capital is inecient because their marginal
products are not equated across sectors. He ﬁnds that the factor market ineciency accounts 90 to
100% of international dierences in the overall (economy-wide) TFP. Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2004)
show that sectoral distortions in the use of intermediate inputs and labor generate large international
dierences in the overall TFP. Our paper is similar to these papers in that we ﬁnd a large eect on the
overall TFP of a sectoral distortion (due, in our case, to the labor barrier) for prewar Japan. Unlike these
1Thus, contrary to the Lewisian tradition of development economics, we that agricultural workers are paid their
marginal, not their average, product.
2See Caselli (2004) for a survey of the recent burgeoning literature on development accounting.
2papers, however, our analysis is dynamic in that we also examine the eect of the distortion on capital
accumulation.
We show that our simple two-sector growth model, when the labor barrier is superimposed on it, can
account for the prewar Japanese stagnation. We then lift the labor barrier to predict what would have
happened to the prewar Japanese economy. This counter-factual simulation shows that prewar GNP per
worker would have been higher by about 33%, which would have placed Japan at close to a half, not
a third, of the U.S. in terms of per-worker output. This substantial output gain comes about despite a
tight grip of Engel’s law. In our model, minimum food consumption is set at a very high fraction, 90%,
of food consumption in 1885. Given the state of technology for food and non-food production, however,
the country did not need 64% of total employment in agriculture to feed its population in 1885 and after.
The labor force released from agriculture upon the removal of the labor barrier would have been put to
better use outside agriculture and the increased overall production eciency would have sparked an
investment boom.
Theplanofthepaperisasfollows. Thenextsection, Section2, describesfactsaboutJapan’seconomic
development in more detail. Section 3 advances our sectoral mis-allocation hypothesis and summarizes
ourmainresults. Thisisfollowedbyfoursectionsofelaboration: apresentationofthetwo-sectorgrowth
model in Section 4, asymptotic properties of the model in Section 5, a calibration of the model in Section
6, and simulation results in Section 7. The issue of why there existed the barrier in the ﬁrst place will be
taken up in Section 8. Section 9 brieﬂy states conclusions and an agenda for future research.
2. Accounting for Japan’s Economic Development Since 1885
The Postwar Miracle and Prewar Stagnation
Westartoutwithalookataggregateoutputsince1885. Thebasicdatasourceforprewarmacrovariables
for Japan (Japan proper, excluding former colonies) is the Long Term Economic Statistics (hereafter LTES),
a consistent system of national income accounts compiled by a group of Japanese academics. The reader
is referred to Appendix 1 for how real GNP and other variables are constructed from the LTES and other
sources. Figure 1 shows output per worker (real GNP divided by working-age population) for Japan
3and the U.S for 1885-2000, with Japan assumed to be about 71% of the U.S. for 1990.3 The scale is in logs
with a base of 2, so a dierence of 1.0 in the log scale represents a 100% dierence in levels. The log
dierence for 1885 is 1.75, which means U.S. per-worker GNP was about 3.4 (= 21:75) times Japan’s (or
Japan was about 30% of the U.S.) in 1885.







1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
lo g   ( b a s e   is   2 )
U.S. Japan
There are three features that would catch anyone’s eye. The ﬁrst is the fabulous growth in the post-
World War II era, known as the Japanese miracle. There was a ﬁve-fold increase in Japan’s GNP per
worker in 25 years since 1947. The second is the prewar stagnation of several decades: between 1885
and 1940, Japan’s GNP per worker remained 30% to 50% of the U.S. GNP per worker. The average of
the Japan-U.S. ratio of per-worker output is 36%. The third feature is the stagnation in the 1990s. We
have dealt with Japan’s 1990s elsewhere (Hayashi and Prescott (2002)). The question we address in this
paper is why the Japanese miracle didn’t take place until after World War II.
3U.S. real GNP since 1929 is the chained real GNP from the U.S. NIPA (National Income and Product Accounts).
Real GNP before 1929 is from Balke and Gordon (1989). The working-age population is the population 16 years or
older for the U.S. and 15 or older for Japan until 1945 and 21 years or older for the U.S. and 20 or older for Japan after
1945. We assume that the ratio of Japan’s per-worker GNP to that of the U.S. is 71.2% in 1998. This ratio is implied
by Maddison’s (2001) estimate of GDP levels in 1990 international PPP dollars, placing Japan’s GDP at 31.9% of U.S.
GDP for 1990. See his Tables A1-b and A-j.
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where Yt is aggregate output in period t, Kt is aggregate capital stock, Et is employment, ht is average
hours worked per employed person (so htEt equals total hours worked), and  is capital’s share of
aggregate income. In the growth accounting calculations below, we set  to the customary value of 1=3.
















whereNt isworking-agepopulation. Thisformulashowsthat, inthelongrunwherethecapitalintensity
(i.e., the capital-output ratio,
Kt
Yt), the employment rate (
Et
Nt), and hours worked per employed person
(ht) are constant, the trend in GNP per worker (
Yt
Nt) is given by the TFP factor TFP
1
1 
t . The power 1
1 
represents the magniﬁcation eect of TFP that an increase in TFP generates a proportionate increase in




1 ) represents only the part of capital accumulation
not induced by TFP growth.4 The left-side, GNP per worker, has been graphed in Figure 1.
Table 1 reports the average annual growth rate of per-worker GNP and its four factors shown in
(2.2) for prewar and postwar Japan.5 For the high-growth era of 1960-73, despite a decline in both the
average hours worked per worker and the employment rate, a high per-worker GNP growth rate of
7.2% is brought about by a very high TFP growth and, less importantly, by a slight increase in capital





1 ). For the prewar period, there was no increase in capital intensity:
between 1885 and 1940, the capital-output ratio declined. The much lower TFP growth before the war




t in Figure 2 (for now, ignore the line labeled ”without barrier”). Postwar TFP factor lies far above
the dotted trend line extrapolated from the prewar period.
4This formula has been adopted by King and Levine (1994), Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and others. Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) has a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this form of growth accounting
against the more standard form of decomposing output growth into TFP, capital growth, and labor growth.
5We use the deﬂator for non-agricultural goods to convert nominal capital stock into real capital stock in
calculating K. This is to be consistent with the assumption of the paper’s model that agricultural goods cannot be
used as an investment good. See Appendix 1 for more details on how we deﬁned real output Y and the real capital
stock K. Employment and hours worked are not adjusted for quality. The initial year for the postwar period is taken
to be 1960 because the capital stock data in the Japanese national accounts for the early 1950s seems unreliable.
5Table 1: Growth Accounting






















1885-1940 2.1% 2.9% -0.6% -0.4% 0.2%
1960-1973 7.2% 7.3% 0.8% -0.7% -0.2%
Note: Geometric means. Yt = GNP, Kt = capital stock, Et = employment, Nt = working-age
population, ht = average hours per employed person. See (2.1) for the deﬁnition of TFPt.  = 1=3.
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To summarize, Japan’s prewar stagnation can be accounted for by the low level of overall TFP and
falling capital intensity.
63. The Basic Idea and Summary of Results
The Sectoral Mis-allocation Hypothesis
Thethesisofthispaperisthatthelaborbarrier—abarrierlimitingtheextentofrural-to-urbanemigration
— contributed to Japan’s pre-World War II stagnation. We were led to this thesis by the following
observations. Figure 3 shows that employment in agriculture (here and elsewhere excluding forestry
andﬁshery)wasessentiallyconstantat14millionpersonsinprewarJapan.6 Thisﬁgurestronglysuggests
that agricultural employment was constrained to be at least about 14 million. The ﬁgure also shows that,
in sharp contrast to the prewarera, postwar Japan witnessed a steep decline in agricultural employment.
Asthelaborforceexpands, aconstantlevelofemploymentmeansaslowlydecliningemploymentshare.
This is shown in Figure 4, where the employment share of agriculture declined only gradually before
the war and very sharply postwar. It took Japan 50 years to reduce the agricultural employment share
from 60% to 40%. In most other developed countries, the decline was faster: of 16 developed countries
examined in Maddison (1991, Table C.5), agriculture’s employment share in 1950 is highest for Japan
(48.3%), followed by Finland (46.0%) and Italy (45.4%).
6ThesourceisTable33,Volume9(coveringagriculture)ofLTESpublishedin1966. Theestimationofemployment
in the LTES was carried out under the leadership of Mataji Umemura. His 1968 estimate of employment in
agriculture (Umemura (1968)) diers from his 1966 estimate in that agricultural employment slowly declined to
about 16 million by 1914, declined sharply to 14 million between 1914 and 1919, and stayed more or less constant at
14 million thereafter. However, more recent LTES estimate, included in Volume 2 (the lead author of the volume is
Mataji Umemura) published in 1988, has agricultural employment virtually identical to the Volume 9 estimate. See
Appendix 1 for a summary of the methodology used in estimating agricultural employment in the LTES.
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Thankstothelaborbarriersettingthebindinglowerboundof14milliononagriculturalemployment,
there was too much labor tied up in the decreasing-returns-to-scale technology called agriculture. For
reasons explored in Section 8, this barrier ceased to operate after World War II, which must have
contributedatleastinparttotherapidincreaseintheoverallTFPinpostwarJapan. HansenandPrescott
8(2002) described the industrial revolution as a switch from a decreasing-returns-to-scale with respect to
reproducible inputs technology (the Malthus technology) to a constant-returns-to-scale technology (the
Solowtechnology). OurhypothesiscanberephrasedassayingthatthetransitionfromMalthustoSolow
was inhibited by the barrier to labor mobility.
Main Results
The rest of this paper formalizes our sectoral mis-allocation hypothesis for prewar Japan in a two-sector
neoclassical growth model with agriculture and see to what extent the model with labor barrier can
account for the prewar stagnation. The model’s main features are as follows: (i) the actual path of
sectoral TFPs (shown in Figure 5) is taken as given and was perfectly foreseen by agents as of 1885, (ii) the
path of total employment is exogenously given to the model, (iii) the sectoral allocation of capital as well
as capital accumulation are endogenous, (iv) the sectoral allocation of employment is endogenous, albeit
subject to the labor barrier that sets the lower bound of 14 million for employment in the agricultural
sector, and (v) a stringent Engel’s law that the subsistence level of food consumption per worker is 90%
of per-worker food consumption in 1885. The paper’s main results are the following.
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 Our simple two-sector model can account for the prewar stagnation. The simulation (i.e., the solution
path of the model) in which the labor barrier is imposed tracks the prewar data closely. This is shown
for per-worker GNP in Figure 6: the simulation represented by the dotted line labeled “with barrier”
9does not depart substantially from the actual — except for the post-World War I period where the
model consistently over-predicts output (see below for more on the over-prediction for the interwar
period). The lower bound for agricultural employment is binding throughout the prewar period.
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 The quantitative eect of the labor barrier is large. The counter-factual simulation — the solution path
of the model that does not impose the labor barrier but still takes the sectoral TFPs as given — for
per-worker GNP is the line labeled “without barrier” in Figure 6. Japan’s GNP per worker, which was
about a third of the U.S. level for much of the prewar period, would have been substantially higher
(see Table 2 below for more quantitative information), were it not for the barrier.
 There are two main sources of this big gain in aggregate output. The ﬁrst is a production eciency
gain due to the removal of the barrier. Going back to Figure 2, also shown in the ﬁgure is the overall
TFP factor calculated from the counter-factual simulation. It shows that the removal of the barrier-
induced mis-allocation of labor signiﬁcantly raises the overall TFP. (The eciency gain declines with
time because the lower bound for agricultural employment gradually falls as a fraction of total
employment.) The second is an investment boom sparked by the increased production eciency.
Figure 7 plots the capital stock per worker, Kt=Nt, for the three cases, actual and simulations with
and without the barrier. In the counter-factual simulation (without the barrier), the capital stock rises
10sharply in the early prewar period when the improvement in overall production eciency is greatest
(see below for our comments on the interwar capital accumulation).
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 These results are for a closed-economy version of the model in which food is a nontraded good. The
ability of the model with the barrier to account for the prewar stagnation is undiminished even if
food is a traded good. This is because too much labor forced upon agriculture makes the country
nearly self-sucient in food. The dierence arises when the barrier is lifted. The small open-economy
version of the model, if the barrier is not imposed, predicts that the country will specialize almost
completely in good 2, thereby reaping a large gain from trade in addition to the gain in production
eciency and increased capital accumulation. However, as we will argue at the end of Section 7, such
a large trade gain is unlikely because the production frontier describing the tradeo between outputs
of the two sectors is ﬂat when the barrier is removed.
By way of summarizing, Table 2 reports the “level accounting”, comparing actual prewar Japan with
a hypothetical prewar Japan without the barrier predicted by the closed-economy version of the model.
It measures the eect of lifting the labor barrier on each of the factors in (2.2) by calculating the prewar
mean of the ratio of the factor from the counterfactual simulation to the actual value. It shows that the
prewar output gain, which is 33% on average, comes from three sources: the improvement in overall
eciency (already shown in Figure 2), a rapid capital accumulation raising capital intensity, and, less
importantly, a gain in average hours worked ht. This last factor comes about because the employment
11share of agriculture (where hours worked are slightly lower) is lower in the counter-factual simulation
(41% of total employment in 1885).













value without barrier for year t
its actual value for year t 1:33 1:24 1:04 1 1:02
Note: See footnote to Table 1 for deﬁnition of symbols. Because the counter-factual simulation uses actual Et
and Nt, the ratio for the employment rate
Et
Nt is unity by construction.
Before turning to model speciﬁcs, two caveats should be noted.
 Our sectoral mis-allocation alone does not account for the low level of prewar overall TFP described
in Figure 2. Studies on Japan’s postwar growth accounting show that the non-agricultural TFP rose
sharply precisely when the overall TFP did in the postwar period.7 With the sharp rise in the sectoral
TFPs not taking place until after the war, the removal of the labor barrier alone is not enough to lift
the prewar trend line of overall TFP to the postwar level.
 The model has diculty tracking the capital stock in the interwar period. As seen in Figure 6, the
simulation with labor barrier over-predicts interwar output. It comes about because the model wants
to respond to the rise in non-agricultural TFP after World War I (shown in Figure 5) by raising the
capital stock (see Figure 7). Why the actual capital stock ceased to increase after the mid 1920s is a
puzzle to us. Perhaps it has to do with the rapid cartelization in the 1930.8
4. The Two-Sector Model
In this section we present our two-sector growth model. The ﬁrst sector is agriculture and the second
sector is the rest of the economy. Output of sector 1 will be referred to as good 1 or food.
7For example, a very detailed disaggregated study by Nomura (2004), which is unique in its inclusion of the
1960s, shows (see his Table 4-28) that the Japan-U.S. TFP ratio (deﬁned as the ratio of Japan’s TFP to U.S. TFP) for
the whole economy increased from 0.487 in 1960 to 0.813 in 2000. There was a large decline in the TFP ratio for
agriculture from 1.199 in 1960 to 0.737 in 2000 but there was also a rapid TFP growth in manufacturing. The TFP
ratio for autos, for example, shot up from 0.680 in 1960 to 1.391 in 2000.
8According to Takahashi (1975), the number of cartels jumped from the pre-World War I ﬁgure of 7 to 12 in the
1920s and to 48 after 1930.
12Households
There is a stand-in household with Nt working-age members at date t. The size of the household evolves




where cjt is per-member consumption of good j (j = 1;2).
Measure Et of the household work. The household takes total employment Et as given and decides
how it is divided between employment in sector 1 (E1t) and in sector 2 (E2t) (subject to the labor barrier to
be introduced shortly). If employed in sector j, the member works for hjt hours per unit period (j = 1;2).
Hours worked (h1t;h2t) are exogenously given to the household. If wjt is the wage rate in sector j and
sEt  E1t=Et is the fraction of employment in sector 1, the household’s total labor income is
w1th1tE1t + w2th2tE2t =
h
w2th2t + (w1th1t   w2th2t)sEt
i
Et: (4.2)
There is a barrier to labor mobility requiring employment in sector 1 to be at least ¯ E1t:
(the labor barrier) E1t  ¯ E1t i.e., E1t=Et  sEt  ¯ sEt  ¯ E1t=Et: (4.3)
Looking at the expression (4.2) for labor income, we can easily see that the household will set sEt to the
minimum possible value of ¯ sEt (i.e., the labor barrier will be binding) if the income ratio
w1th1t
w2th2t is less than
unity, to the maximum possible value of unity if it is greater than unity, and to any value between the
minimum and the maximum if there is no income disparity. Thus the household’s choice of sEt is the
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There are two other sources of income for the household. First, if Ntkt is the capital stock owned by
the household (so kt is the capital stock per worker), its rental income is rtNtkt. Unlike labor, we assume
no barrier to capital mobility between sectors, so the rental rate rt does not depend on which sector rents
capital.9 Second, there is a rent earned from land, an input to sector 1’s production. The period-budget
9The rental rate is net of intermediation costs. See below on ﬁrms in sector 2.
13constraint for the household, then, is
qtNtc1t + Ntc2t + Nt+1kt+1   (1   t)Ntkt = w1th1tE1t + w2th2tE2t + rtNtkt   t(rt   t)Ntkt   t; (4.5)
where t is the depreciation rate (allowed to be time-dependent), qt is the relative price of good 1 in terms
of good 2, t is the tax rate on net-of-depreciation capital income, and t is taxes other than the capital
income tax less land rent. The second good is the numeraire. So, for example, w1t is the sector 1 wage
rate in terms of good 2. Since hours worked as well as total employment Et are exogenous, the tax on
labor income is not distortionary and is included in t.
With sEt ( E1t=Et) determined according to (4.4) for each t and thus with the path of labor income
w1th1tE1t + w2th2tE2t given, the stand-in household chooses a sequence fc1t;c2t;kt+1g1
t=0 so as to maximize
its utility (4.1) subject to the sequence of period-budget constraints (4.5) for t = 0;1;2;:::. If t 1
t is
the Lagrange multiplier for the period t budget constraint (i.e., if t is the ratio of t to the Lagrange













t+1 = t[1 + (1   t+1)(rt+1   t+1)]: (4.8)
Since t is the reciprocal of the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, it measures how wealthy
the consumer is. The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption, (4.6) and (4.7), can be solved to obtain the
Frisch demand system:
c1t = c1(qt;t) and c2t = c2(qt;t): (4.9)





R1  R2 Rt
= 0 where Rt  1 + (1   t)(rt   t): (4.10)
Firms
The production function for sector 1 is





where TFP1t is the sector’s total factor productivity, K1t is capital input (demand for capital services),
and L1t is labor input (total hours worked demanded) in sector 1. Land is the third input, but since
14it is constant, its contribution is submerged in the TFP. Because of the existence of the ﬁxed factor of
production, we have a decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor: 1 +  < 1. The ﬁrst-order
conditions, which equate marginal productivities to factor prices, for ﬁrms in sector 1 are










Production in sector 2 does not require land and exhibits constant returns to scale:





Unlike in sector 1, capital input in sector 2 involves costly ﬁnancial intermediation. That is, if the
household wishes to rent machines to sector 2, those machines need to be deposited at a bank. The bank
then rents out those machines to ﬁrms in sector 2. This ﬁnancial intermediation is costly because the
bank incurs a cost of  per machine for this intermediation service. This means that the rental rate faced
by ﬁrms in sector 2 is rt +, while the rental rate for the household net of the intermediation cost is rt (as
assumed in the household budget constraint (4.5)). Therefore, the ﬁrst-order conditions for sector 2 is










There are two reasons for assuming costly intermediation, one having to do with model calibration
and the other with realism. First, the low level of capital intensity in prewar Japan means a high level of
marginal productivity of capital. For the Euler equation (see (6.6) below) requiring consumption growth
to be equated with the net rate of return from capital, we need a wedge between the gross return and
the net return over and above depreciation. Second, there is some evidence that prewar intermediation
costs were substantial. The long-term data on bank lending rate compiled by Fujino and Akiyama (1977)
shows that the average spread (the dierence between the bank lending rate and the time deposit rate)
for 1899-1940 was 4.0%.
Was Food a Nontraded Good?
To state market equilibrium conditions, we need to decide if food (sector 1 output or good 1) is a
nontraded good. The data on material balance for food, shown in Table 3, indicate to us that, as a ﬁrst
approximation, food was a nontraded good because net imports (imports less exports) of food were
for most years less than 10% of domestic production. An alternative explanation of the unimportance
15of food imports is that food was freely tradable but the abundant labor input to agriculture due to the
labor barrier made it unnecessary for the country to import food. We solved the model under these two
alternative assumptions about the tradability of food and found that the solution is not sensitive to the
assumption, provided that the labor barrier is imposed on the model. However, when the barrier is
lifted, the model solution depends very much on whether the food market is open or not. We proceed
under the assumption that food is a nontraded good and postpone our discussion of the open-economy
case until the last two subsections of Section 7, because for reasons stated there we ﬁnd the prediction of
the open-economy version of the model implausible.
Table 3: Food Material Balance for Selected Years in Millions of 1934-36 Yen
year (1) domestic production (2) exports (3) imports
(4) domestic consumption
(equals (1)-(2)+(3))
(5) net imports ratio
(equals ((3)-(2)/(1)))
1885 1;464:2 36:6 3:7 1;431:3  2:2%
1900 1;846:3 36:3 43:2 1;853:2 0:4%
1910 2;135:2 59:8 98:9 2;174:3 1:8%
1920 2;867:8 42:9 225:2 3;050:1 6:4%
1930 3;202:7 84:1 535:6 3;654:2 14:1%
1939 3;450:5 91:8 431:7 3;790:5 9:9%
Note: Food here refers to the output of the agricultural sector (see Appendix 1 for a precise deﬁnition). The
deﬂator for sector 1 output is used to convert nominal ﬁgures into real. The data source is LTES. See Appendix 1
for deﬁnition of the variables including food exports and imports.
Market Equilibrium
If sector 1 output (i.e., food) is nontraded, the market equilibrium condition for good 1 is (4.17) below.
The second good can be either consumed or invested. We also assume that government purchases Gt
are on the second good. Thus the market equilibrium conditions are (recall that sEt  E1t=Et)
(good 1) Ntc1t = Y1t; (4.17)
(good 2) Ntc2t + (Nt+1kt+1   (1   t)Ntkt) + Gt = Y2t   K2t; (4.18)
(capital services) K1t + K2t = Ntkt; (4.19)
(labor in sector 1) L1t = h1tsEtEt; (4.20)
(labor in sector 2) L2t = h2t(1   sEt)Et: (4.21)
16Intheequilibriumconditionforgood2, thesupplyofgood2isY2t K2t, notY2t, becauseoftheresource
dissipation incurred in moving capital from the household to sector 2.
A competitive equilibrium given the initial per-worker capital stock k0 and the sequence of exogenous
variables fGt, Et, h1t, h2t, TFP1t;TFP2t;t;tg1
t=0 is a sequence of prices and quantities, ft, qt, w1t;w2t, rt,
kt+1, K1t;K2t, sEt, L1t;L2tg1
t=0, satisfying the following conditions:
(i) the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (4.4), (4.8), and (4.9), and the transversality condition (4.10),
(ii) the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions (4.12), (4.13), (4.15), and (4.16),
(iii) the market-clearing conditions (4.17)-(4.21),
where Y1t is given by (4.11) and Y2t by (4.14).
Two remarks about the model:
 The model is “closed” in that food is a nontraded good, but the country can lend or borrow good 2 to
and from abroad. As in Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we treat foreign capital (claims on the rest of the
world) as part of the capital stock, so investment here (Nt+1kt+1   (1   t)Ntkt) is the sum of domestic
investmentandthecurrentaccount,andqtY1t+Y2t isGNP(intermsofgood2),notGDP.Thistreatment
of foreign capital implies an imperfect mobility of capital in that the rate of return on foreign capital
is not exogenously given to the country. Appendix 5 shows that the sector 2 production function
deﬁned over total (domestic plus foreign) capital and labor can be derived from two technologies,
one describing domestic output deﬁned over domestic capital and labor, and the other describing
the return from foreign capital. The Appendix also shows that the derived production function is
essentially Cobb-Douglas for a particular form of imperfect capital mobility and a Cobb-Douglas
production function for domestic output.
 As is standard in the real business-cycle models with non-distortionary taxes, the sequence of taxes is
not included in the equilibrium conditions, because the amount of the lump-sum tax is endogenously
determined so that the government budget constraint holds period-by-period. By the Ricardian
equivalence, any other sequence of taxes with the same present value results in the same competitive
equilibrium. This also means that the household budget constraint doesn’t need to be included
as part of the equilibrium conditions because it is implied by the market-clearing conditions, the
government budget constraint, and the factor exhaustion condition (that payments to factors of
production, including land, sum to output).
17Reducing Equilibrium Conditions into a Two-Equation Detrended Dynamical System










To anticipate, XQt will be the trend for the relative price qt, while XYt serves to detrend t as well as
per-worker quantities related to sector 2 such as kt, Y2t=Nt, and c2t. Per-worker quantities related to
sector 1, such as Y1t=Nt and c1t, are detrended by XYt=XQt. Therefore, sector 1’s nominal output share,
qtY1t
qtY1t+Y2t, will have no trend. We will assume that the sector 1 trend, XYt=XQt, grows without limit. If XQ,
too, grows (which is the case in our calibration of the model), then per-worker output grows for both
sectors but sector 1 will become asymptotically insigniﬁcant in real terms.
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It is shown in Appendix 2 (and in Appendix 3 for the case with intermediate inputs) that the above
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˜ y2t  ˜ k
2
t (1   sKt)2 (1   sEt)1 2: (4.27)
This is a dynamical system in two variables, the detrended capital stock ˜ kt and the detrended shadow
price ˜ t, because the other endogenous variables appearing in the system, (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt), are functions of
(˜ kt; ˜ t).
Those functions relating (˜ kt; ˜ t) to (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt) can be obtained as follows (see Appendix 2 for more
details). The market equilibrium condition for good 1 (4.17) and the equality of the marginal products
18of capital between two sectors (implied by (4.12) and (4.15)) can be written as
(market equilibrium for good 1)
˜ qtc1(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt
= ˜ qt ˜ y1t; (4.28)
(equqlity of marginal products of capital) 1
˜ qt ˜ y1t
sKtkt












Furthermore, when ¯ sEt is low enough so that the labor barrier is not binding, we have w1th1t = w2th2t or
w1th1t
w2th2t = 1, which can be reduced to
(equality of sectoral incomes)







For each period t, given (˜ kt; ˜ t), we can solve (4.28), (4.29), and (4.31) for (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt). If the sEt thus
obtained does not satisfy the labor barrier sEt  ¯ sE1t, then we set sEt = ¯ sEt and use (4.28) and (4.29) to
solve for (sKt; ˜ qt). Appendix 2 shows that this procedure solves for the equilibrium under the inequality
constraint sEt  ¯ sEt.
By way of summarizing this subsection, let xt  (˜ kt; ˜ t) and yt  (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt), and write the two-
equation dynamical system (4.25) and (4.26) as
xt+1 = ft(xt;yt); yt = gt(xt): (4.32)
Here, gisthefunctiondescribedinthepreviousparagraphthatdeterminesyt subjecttothelaborbarrier.
In standard one-sector real business cycle models, the relevant dynamical system governing the capital
stock and the shadow price can be made autonomous (i.e., equations does not shift over time) upon
suitable detrending, under the assumption that the exogenous variables (or the growth rates thereof)
settle down to constants in the long run. Imposing the transversality condition is then accomplished
by locating the stable saddle path of the autonomous sytem. In contrast, as will be veriﬁed in the next
section, our two-sector model remain non-autonomous even after detrending, because Engel’s law and
thetime-varyingnatureofthelaborbarrierrenderthefandgfunctionsnon-stationary(i.e.,time-varying,
with t subscript). How to locate the stable saddle path for the present non-autnomous dynamical system
is the subject of the next section, which shows that the familiar shooting algorithm is applicable. The
reader can skip the next section without losing continuity.
195. Existence of An Asymptotic Steady State
We assume that the share of government purchases and hours worked as well as the growth rates of the
trending exogenous variables eventually become constant:














We assume n > 0, so the lower bound ¯ sEt  ¯ E1t=Et goes to 0 as t ! 1. Unlike in standard real
business cycle models, an assumption like (5.1) is not enough to render the detrended dynamical system
(4.32) autonomous in the long run for two reasons. First, since XYt and XQt are not constant, neither
c2(˜ qtXQt;˜ tXYt)
XYt in (4.25) nor
c1(˜ qtXQt;˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt in (4.28) may be a stationary (i.e., time-invariant) function of (˜ qt; ˜ t).
If
c2(˜ qtXQt;˜ tXYt)
XYt is nonstationary, then so is the f function of the dynamical system (4.32), and if
c1(˜ qtXQt;˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt
is nonstationary, then so is the g function of the dynamical system. Second, even if
c1(˜ qtXQt;˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt in (4.28) is
stationary, the g function, which is derived from (4.28), (4.29), and (4.31), is still a non-stationary function








are time-invariant function of (˜ q; ˜ ) when XYt and XYt=XQt grow at constant rates, so the only reason the
dynamical system is non-autonomous is the time-varying binding lower bound ¯ sEt. It is easy to show










XYt are stationary functions for any time path (not just exponential
paths) of (XYt;XQt). The utility function that generates this demand system is linear logarithmic:
u(c1;c2) = 1 log(c1) + 2 log(c2):
We can now describe a method for ﬁnding the solution to the dynamical system under (5.2) and (5.3).
(i) There is a set over which the dynamical system is autonomous. As explained in the previous
section, the labor barrier does not bind if and only if the sEt that solves (4.28), (4.29), and (4.31) is
greater than ¯ sEt ( ¯ Et=Et). Let At be the set of (˜ k; ˜ ) such that the labor barrier does not bind. The set
dependsontbecause ¯ sEt isafunctionoftime. Under(5.2), noneofthesethreeequationsinvolvethe
trends, so the g function is stationary over At. Furthermore, under (5.3), the f function is stationary
because (4.25) no longer involves the time trends. So the dynamical system is autonomous over
At.
(ii) Since ¯ sEt declines with time thanks to a positive employment growth n > 0, this set At expands
with time. Let (˜ kss; ˜ ss;sK;ss;sE;ss; ˜ qss) be the steady state for the autonomous dynamical system. It is
obtained by dropping the time subscript from (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt; ˜ kt; ˜ t) in (4.25)-(4.31). The Inada condition
ensures that sE;ss > 0 (agriculture does not disappear in the long run, thanks to decreasing returns)
so that, with ¯ sEt approaching 0 as t ! 1, (˜ kss; ˜ ss) is an interior point of At for suciently large t.
(iii) It is veriﬁed numerically for the calibrated parameter values (see Appendix 3) that the eigenvalues
of the two-dimensional linearlized system at the steady state (˜ kss; ˜ ss) consist of one that is greater
10Here is a proof of (5.2) (proof of (5.3) is similar). Suppose
c1(˜ qXQt;˜ XYt)
XYt=XQt is a stationary function of (˜ q; ˜ ) when
XYt = exp(at) and XQt = exp(bt). Then
c1

˜ qexp(at); ˜ exp(bt)

exp((b   a)t) = f(˜ q; ˜ ;a;b):
This has to hold for any a;b. Set b = 0, dierentiate both sides of this equation by t, and then set a = 0 to obtain
c1(˜ q; ˜ ) +
@c1(˜ q; ˜ )
@˜ q
˜ q = 0; i.e.,






This partial dierential equation can be solved to yield: c1(˜ q; ˜ ) = A(˜ ) 1
˜ q. A similar argument gives c1(˜ q; ˜ ) = B(˜ q)˜ .
So A(˜ ) 1
˜ q = B(˜ q)˜ . Set ˜ q = 1 to obtain A(˜ ) = B(1)˜ . Deﬁne 1  B(1).
21than unity and the other that is less than unity. Therefore, the steady state is a saddle point for
the autonomous system deﬁned over At. So for suciently large t, the solution of the dynamical
system is on the stable saddle path converging to the steady state (˜ kss; ˜ ss). The intermediate path
leading to the saddle path from a given capital stock ˜ k0 can then be determined in the usual way,
by the shooting algorithm that takes ˜ 0 as the “jumping variable”. That is, take T large enough so
that the solution is near the steady state. If the initial value ˜ 0 is such that (˜ kT; ˜ T) is above the
saddle path, then adjust the initial value ˜ 0 down; if (˜ kT; ˜ T) is below the saddle path, adjust the
initial value up.
It should be noted in passing that the dynamical system starting from (˜ kss; ˜ ss) would not stay there
because at t = 0 the labor barrier may be binding (that is, (˜ kss; ˜ ss) may not be in A0). Therefore, (˜ kss; ˜ ss)
should be called an asymptotic steady state.
The Stone-Geary Utility Function
The problem with the linear-logarithmic utility function is its counter-factual implication that the share
offoodexpenditureisconstantat1. ToaccommodateEngel’slaw,weintroduceminimumconsumption
for food:11
u(c1;c2) = 1 log(c1   d1) + 2 log(c2); d1 > 0: (5.4)
Now the food demand is given not by (5.2) but by

















XYt, so nowhere in the (˜ k; ˜ ) plane is the dynamical system (4.32) autonomous.
However, this two-dimensional non-autonomous system can be converted to a three-dimensional
autonomous system.12 Deﬁne
zt  XQt=XYt: (5.6)
11This is not the only utility function that exhibits Engel’s Law and that is “asymptotically log linear” in the sense
discussed in this paragraph. See Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) for other choices of the utility function. We
choose Stone-Geary because it is the simplest.
12We are grateful to Lars Hansen for suggesting this idea.
22By the deﬁnition (4.22) of trends XYt and XQt and by the constant-growth assumption (5.1), zt for








Add this equation to the two-equation dynamical system to form a three-equation dynamical system in
(˜ kt; ˜ t;zt). Clearly, this augmented system is autonomous for suciently large t when the labor barrier is
not binding (because (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt) is a stationary function of (˜ kt; ˜ t;zt)). Suppose that the parameters of the
model is such that zt ! 0 as t ! 1 (i.e., the trend in per-capita output of sector 2 (XYt) grows faster than
the trend for the relative price (XQt) in the long run), which is the case in our calibration below. Then
the detrended minimum consumption d1
XQt
XYt in (5.5) vanishes in the long run, so the steady state is given
by (˜ kss; ˜ ss;0) where (˜ kss; ˜ ss) is the steady state for the two-dimensional autonomous system with d1 = 0
deﬁned above. Obviously, the eigenvalues for the three-dimensional linearized system at this steady
state consist of the two eigenvalues for the two-dimensional system with d1 = 0 mentioned above and
the stable growth factor for zt (the zt coecient in (5.7)). So the system has two roots that are less than
one and one that is greater than one under the calibrated parameter values. We were able to ﬁnd the
solution by a variant of the shooting algorithm, with ˜ 0 as the jumping variable.13
6. Calibration of the Model and Speciﬁcation of Exogenous Variables
To numerically solve the model from 1885 on, we need to calibrate the model by providing parameter
values, specify the path of exogenous variables, and give an initial condition. The initial capital stock
is taken to be its actual value in 1885. In this section, we describe our calibration of the model and
speciﬁcation of the path of exogenous variables.
13For a large T, the algorithm lowers (raises) ˜ 0 if (˜ kT; ˜ T) is above (below) the saddle path corresponding to zt = 0
for all t. Because convergence to the steady state is slow, we modiﬁed the algorithm as follows. We set T = 60 and
examine (˜ kt0+T; ˜ t0+T), initially for t0 = 1. If we ﬁnd ˜ t0 and ˜ 0
t0 such that j˜ t0   ˜ 0
t0j < 0:01˜ ss, and (˜ kt0+T; ˜ t0+T) is above
the saddle path for ˜ t0 and and below it for ˜ 0
t0, then we ﬁx ˜ t0+T=2 at the average of the ˜ t0+T=2 corresponding to
those two ˜ t0’s and move the initial period forward to t0 = T=2. Starting from this new initial period t0, we examine
(˜ kt0+T; ˜ t0+T) and do the same procedure to move the initial date forward by another T=2 periods. This process is
repeated until the distance between the steady state and the solution path thus constructed is less than 0:01.
23Calibration for Prewar Japan
As explained in the previous section, we accommodate Engel’s Law by the Stone-Geary utility function
reproduced here:
u(c1;c2) = 1 log(c1   d1) + 2 log(c2); d1 > 0: (6.1)
Here, d1 is the subsistence level of food consumption. We can normalize so that 1 + 2 = 1. The
associated Frisch demand system is
c1(q;) = d1 + 1

q
and c2(q;) = 2 : (6.2)
The preference parameters of the model are (1;2;d1) and the discounting factor .
Turning to technology parameters, for expositional clarity, we have ignored intermediate inputs to
production, whereas the model we actually solve with and without the labor barrier accomodates them.
With intermediate inputs, the production functions for the two sectors are












2t with 2 + 2 + 2 = 1; (6.3)
where Yjt is now gross output of sector j (j = 1;2), M1t is the amount of good 2 used in sector 1 and M2t
is good 1 used in sector 2. From here on, we use the symbol Y for (gross) output. With new parameters,
1 and 2, representing the shares of intermediate inputs in output, gross output and value added are
related by the formula:
value added in sector 1 in year t = Y1t   qtM1t = (1   1)Y1t; (6.4)
value added in sector 2 in year t = Y2t   M1t=qt   K2t = (1   2)Y2t   K2t: (6.5)
The model’s technology parameters are the share parameters (1;;1;2;2) and the intermediation
parameter  (the fraction of capital dissipated in moving capital from the household to sector 2). Ap-
pendix 3 describes in detail how the model of the text, which does not recognize intermediate inputs,
can be generalized with the production functions above.14
We calibrate this model with intermediate inputs as follows (see Appendix 1 for a documentation of
the variables used in the calibration).
14With intermediate inputs, the dynamical system (4.25), (4.26), (4.28), (4.29), and (4.31) becomes (A3.24)-(A3.28).
The required modiﬁcations are: (a) redeﬁnition of TFPs as in (A3.9) and (A3.19), (b) a modiﬁcation of the trends
XYt and XQt (see (A3.21) and (A3.22)), (c) redeﬁnition of detrended production functions (see (A3.23)), and (d) an
explicit recognition of resources used up as sector 1’s intermediate input in the resource constraint for good 2 (see
the last term of (A3.24)) and as sector 2’s intermediate input in the equilibrium condition for good 1 (see the second
term on the left side of (A3.26)).
24 Thedeﬁnitionofthetwosectors. Sector1isagricultureproper, whichconsistsofindustriesproducing
thefollowingagriculturalgoods: rice, wheat, barley, rye, oats, miscellaneouscereals, potatoes, pulses,
vegetables,fruits&nuts,industrialcrops,greenmanure&foragecrops,sericultureproducts,livestock
& poultry, and straw goods. Sector 2 is the rest of the economy.
 1;;1 (theshareparametersforcapital,labor,intermediateinputsector1): Theshareofintermediate
inputs in agriculture for each year (call it 1t here) is reported in the LTES. Its prewar average of 0.146
is our calibrated value of 1. Gross output of sector 1 is calculated as the sector’s value added (also
available from the LTES) divided by (1   1t). Table J-5 of Yamada and Hayami (1979) (reproduced
as Table 2-11 of Hayami (1975)) has gross output factor shares in agriculture for selected years. Their
capital cost, however, ignores depreciation. We construct capital cost from the LTES.15 The ratio of
this capital cost to sector 1 gross output just described has no clear trend. The average over 1886-1940
is 0.144, which is our calibrated value of 1. The average of the Yamada-Hayami estimate of labor
share is adjusted to reﬂect the dierence in the capital cost estimate between theirs and ours. This
produces:  = 0:545 (so land rent’s share is 1 0:146 0:144 0:545 = 0:165). The labor share of value
added, therefore, is 0:545=(1   0:146) = 0:638.
  (discounting factor) and  (proportional cost of intermediation): Under the Stone-Geary utility
function (6.1), we have c2t = 2t. Substituting this into the Euler equation (4.8), we obtain
 1 c2;t+1
c2t
= 1 + (1   t+1)(rt+1   t+1): (6.6)
The right-hand-side of this equation can be written as






     t+1
!
  t+1(rt+1   t+1) (by (4.15)): (6.8)
Since we assume that the tax base for capital income taxation is net of depreciation, the last term
t+1(rt+1  t+1) equals capital income tax per unit of capital, TAXt+1=(p2;t+1(K1;t+1 +K2;t+1)), where TAX
is the amount of capital income tax and p2t is the deﬂator for good 2. Therefore, the Euler equation














15The LTES has gross investment and the capital stock by asset type for agriculture. From this we can calculate
the implicit depreciation rates and the user cost of capital (we assumed a real rate of return of 5% when calculating
the user cost).
25We set  to the standard value of 0:96. The depreciation rate  is calculated from data for each year t
(see Appendix 1 on t for more details). We take the sample average of both sides for 1885-1940 and
solve for , which gives a calibrated value of  = 0:0371. If, instead, we set  = 0 and use this Euler
equation to solve for , the calibrated  is  = 0:928.
 2 (the share of intermediate inputs in sector 2): The dierence between the sum of gross output and
net imports and domestic consumption equals the amount of good 1 used in sector 2. Let x be the
prewar average of
(gross output of good 1 + net imports of good 1   consumption of good 1)  qt
value added in sector 2 + K2t
:
This x should be an estimate of 2=(1 2) because the denominator equals (1 2) times gross output
in sector 2 (see (6.5)). The calibrated value of 2 is x=(1 + x).
 2 (capital’s share in sector 2’s gross output): With intermediate inputs, this 2 divided by (1   2)
is capital’s share in value added. The LTES has no income accounts, so this parameter cannot be
estimated solely from the LTES. There is an estimate of capital’s share in value added for the prewar
private nonagricultural sector by Minami and Ono (1978). It rises from 39.4% for 1896 to 54.2% for
1940. They note, however, that the capital share does not show a trend in prewar U.S., Canada, and
the U.K. A trend is absent in Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973, Table 17), whose capital share estimate for
1908-1938 is between 33.5% and 50.2%. Our view is that there is no deﬁnitive evidence in favor of a
trend in capital share. So we set 2=(1   2) to the customary value of 1=3. Under constant returns to
scale for sector 2, labor’s share in value added is 2=3.16
 d1 (food subsistence level) and 1, 2 (expenditure shares in the Stone-Geary utility function (6.1)):
We set d1 equal to 90% of per-worker consumption of good 1 (sector 1 output) in 1885. Under the
Stone-Geary utility function, the Frisch demand system is c1t = d1 + 1
t







The calibrated value of 1=2 is the prewar average of this. 1 and 2 can be obtained from this
because 2 = 1   1. Therefore, the calibrated value of (1;2) depends on d1. With the Stone-Geary
utility function, food expenditure share approaches 1 as the household gets wealthier. When d1 is





1 2 = 1. Labor’s share in value added equals
2
1 2.
2690% of per-worker food consumption in 1885, the implied value of 1 is 0.142, which is in line with
food expenditure share in most present-day developed countries.17
Calibrated values are displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: Calibration of the Model
parameter calibrated value
d1 (minimum subsistence level for good 1) 90% of per-worker food consumption in 1885
1 (asymptotic consumption share of good 1) 0.142
2 (asymptotic consumption share of good 2) 0.858
 (discounting factor) 0.96
1 (capital share in sector 1 gross output) 0.144
 (labor share in sector 1 gross output) 0.545
1 (share of intermediate inputs in sector 1) 0.146
2=(1   2) (capital share in sector 2’s value added) 1/3
2 (share of intermediate inputs in sector 2) 0.0587
 (proportional intermediation cost) 0.0371
Time Path of Exogenous Variables
The exogenous variables are:
h1t, h2t (hours worked in two sectors), TFP1t and TFP2t (sectoral TFPs), Et (aggregate employment),
¯ E1t (lower bound for sector 1 employment E1t),  t (share of government expenditure in sector 2’s
output),Nt (working-agepopulation),t (time-varyingdepreciationrate),andt (taxrateoncapital
income).
For these variables except for ¯ E1t, we use their actual values for the sample period (1885-1940). See
Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the construction of those exogenous variables. Regarding the
lower bound ¯ E1t, which is not necessarily observable, we set it equal to the actual employment in sector
1. This does not amount to forcing the labor barrier to bind during the sample period; if we relax the
17As will be reported in the next section, however, simulation results are similar when d1 is 50%, instead of 90%,
of per-worker food consumption in 1885 with an implied value of 1 is 0:255.
27labor barrier by setting ¯ E1t slightly below the actual sector 1 employment, the solution of the model sets
E1t equal to this lower value ¯ E1t and the income ratio
w1th1t
w2th2t remains less than one during the sample
period.
For periods beyond the sample period, the projected values of those exogenous variables are set as
in Table 5 (later we will examine the sensitivity of simulations to the projected value for g2 (the TFP
growth for sector 2)). We are assuming that in the prewar period agents did not anticipate the actual
development of the exogenous variables in the postwar period, let alone the war.
Table 5: How Exogenous Variables are Projected into the Future
the exogenous variable its projection
h1;h2 (hours worked) h1t = h1;1940 = 59:0 and h2t = h2;1940 = 62:3 for t > 1940
 (depreciation rate) t = 1940 = 5:06% for t > 1940
g1; g2 (TFP growth factors for two sectors)
projected growth rates set to their averages for 1885-1940
of 0.96% and 1.66%, respectively. So g1t = 1:0096, g2t = 1:0166
for t > 1940.
n (growth factor of aggregate employment
and working-age population)
set to the geometric mean over 1885-1940 of the growth
rate of working-age population of 1.10%. So nt = 1:0110
for t > 1940.
  (government share of sector 2 output)  t =  1940 = 27:4% for t > 1940
 (tax rate on capital income) t = 1940 = 47:2% for t > 1940
¯ E1t (lowerboundforsector1employment) ¯ E1t = ¯ E1;1940 = 13.55 million persons
7. Findings
With the model calibrated, the path of exogenous variables speciﬁed, and the initial condition given, we
can now answer two questions: How closely does the model track historical data? What would have
happened had there been no labor barrier? The ﬁrst question is answered by solving the model with
the labor barrier in place, namely, by conducting a simulation with the barrier. The latter question is
answered by solving the model without the labor barrier, namely, by the counter-factual simulation.
Solving the model consists of two steps. We ﬁrst solve the detrended dynamical system (4.25), (4.26),
(4.28), (4.29), and (4.31) (or more precisely, with intermediate inputs, (A3.24)-(A3.28)) for the path of
28˜ kt (detrended capital stock), ˜ t (the co-state variable measuring the household’s wealth), ˜ qt (detrended
relative price of food), sE (agriculture’s employment share), and sK (agriculture’s capital share) for
t = 1885;1886;:::, with and without the labor barrier. Second, we undo the detrending by multiplying
(˜ kt; ˜ t) by XYt and ˜ qt by XQt to back out the solution (kt;t;qt) before detrending.
The model presented in the text (and more fully in Appendix 3 with intermediate inputs) assumes
that food (sector 1 output) is a nontraded good. This model will be referred to as the “closed-economy”
version although, as noted in Section 4 and more formally in Appendix 5, the country can borrow and
lend good 2 from abroad. For the most part, our discussion of simulation results is for this case. The
other case — the small open-economy version of the model where the country is allowed to trade good
1 for good 2 at a given terms of trade — will be discussed in the last two subsections.
Closed-Economy Results about Sectoral Resource Allocation
Simulation results for (sEt;sKt;qt) with and without the barrier are displayed in Figures 8-10. With the
barrier in place, the constraint setting the lower bound on sector 1 employment is binding for more than
150 years. This occurs despite the declining lower bound as a fraction of employment because sector 2’s
TFP surges during the interwar years and is assumed to grow faster than sector 1’s TFP after 1940. This
is why, in Figure 8, the graph of sEt from the simulation with the barrier coincides with the data. For
the same reason, the income ratio
w1th1t
w2th2t (not graphed here) remains at about one quarter throughout the
sample period. Figure 8 also shows that, without the labor barrier, substantially lower fraction of the
labor force would have been employed in sector 1. With minimum food consumption taking up 90%
of food consumption in 1885 and with no option to import food, the country is on the yoke of Engel’s
law. Even so, devoting as high a fraction of the labor force as observed is by no means an ecient way
to deliver food to the starving population; a more ecient way to deliver food is less labor and more
capital. This is why sKt (agriculture’s capital share) is lower with the labor barrier than without the
barrier, as shown in Figure 9.
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Turning to qt (the relative price of food in terms of non-food), which is endogenous in the present
case of the closed-economy version of the model, Figure 10 shows that the model with the barrier tracks
the observed relative price fairly well. This means that, with the labor barrier, there would not have
been much trade even if food were tradable. The divergence between the data and the simulation with
the barrier in the 1930s may be due to the fact, shown in Table 3, that food imports became signiﬁcant
30during that period. Figure 10 also shows, predictably, that food would have been far more expensive if
the labor barrier did not exist.
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To illustrate the eect of the barrier-induced sectoral mis-allocation of labor and capital, Figure 11
displaystwoproductionfrontiersimpliedbythemodelfor1885giventhe1885valueofthecapitalstock.
The solid black line, the one closer to the origin, is the frontier when sector 1’s employment share is
constrained to be 64% (the 1885 value). The output measure here is net output (deﬁned as gross output
less intermediate inputs) per worker, so the frontier is well-deﬁned for negative values.18 The gray thick
line, which has much less curvature, is the frontier when the barrier is removed. The black constrained
frontier is tangent to it. The production frontier with the labor barrier requiring sector 1’s employment
share to be at least 64% is the black line to the left of the point of tangency and the gray line to the right of
it. Theper-workerconsumptionvectorimpliedbythemodelwiththebarrierisindicatedintheﬁgureby
the black circle. The vector of net output is the white circle on the frontier. It is to the left of the tangency
point, so the labor barrier is binding. The two circles are lined up vertically because good 1 is neither
used for investment nor consumed by the government. The vertical distance between the two circles,
18Using the notation introduced in (6.3) where the symbol Y refers to gross output, net output is deﬁned as
Y1t   M2t for sector 1 and Y2t   M1t   K2t for sector 2, with K2t representing the intermediation cost. Net output
should not be confused with value added deﬁned in (6.4) and (6.5).
31therefore, is the sum of investment (domestic investment plus the current account) and government
expenditure. Without the barrier, the consumption vector is indicated by the black triangle and the
net-output vector is the white triangle on the frontier. The white triangle is far above the black triangle,
implying that there would have been an investment boom in 1885 and so the production frontiers in
subsequent years would have expanded more rapidly than they actually did, were it not for the barrier.
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Closed-Economy Results about Aggregate Variables
For each simulation, given the solution (kt;t;sEt;sKt;qt) and given the path of the exogenous variables,
other variables of interest can be calculated using the formulas in Section 4 (or more precisely, with
intermediate inputs, the formulas in Appendix 3). Those variables include the aggregate capital stock
Kt, average hours worked ht, real GNP, and the overall TFP. Regarding real GNP, since the relative price
qt in data and from the simulation can and do dier (see Figure 10), we need to do a PPP (purchasing
power parity) calculation to make the real GNP in data and from the simulation comparable. For the
base year of 1935, PPP-adjusted real GNP from the simulation is calculated using the Geary-Khamis
32formula.19 Real GNP for other years are extended from this 1935 value using the chain-type Fisher
quantity index using sectoral value added and the relative price from the simulation. Given real GNP,
employment, average hours worked, and the capital stock, the overall TFP implied by the simulation
can be calculated as in the growth accounting of Section 2.
In Section 3 we have already commented on the simulation results about real per-worker GNP (in
Figure 6), the overal TFP (in Figure 2), and capital accumulation (in Figure 7). Our main ﬁnding was
that labor barrier had two depressing eects. First, it prevented the economy’s factor endowments to be
allocated eciently, thus reducing the overall production eciency measured by TFP. (The eciency-
reducing eect of the labor barrier was visually illustrated by the two production frontiers in Figure 11.)
Second, this distortion in factor allocation was a powerful hindrance to capital accumulation.
A summary for the simulation results discussed so far is displayed in the ﬁrst row of Table 6.
Table 6: Alternative Assumptions
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No. 90% 1.042 1.035 1.129 0.253 40.9% 24.3% 1.327 1.243 1.044 1 1.023
No. 50% 1.051 1.047 1.111 0.288 32.5% 23.5% 1.351 1.237 1.063 1 1.028
Yes. 90% 1.015 1.041 1 0.246 0.70% 0.04% 1.671 1.556 1.017 1 1.055
Note: c1;1885 here is actual per-worker food consumption in 1885.
19The formula, when applied to two countries, is as follows. For two countries, x = a;b, let (Yx
1;Yx
2;qx) be the
outputs (measured in value added) of two sectors and the relative price (the price of good 1 in terms of good 2) and












































This is a system of four equations in four unknowns (Pa;Pb;v1;v2). Because the system is homogeneous, a scalar
multiple of a solution is also a solution. So without loss of generality we can normalize Pa = 1.
33Still maintaining the assumption that food is a nontraded good, we examine several variations of
the model. The ﬁrst is to loosen the grip of Engel’s law. Recall from our calibration that d1 (minimum
food consumption) in the Geary-Stong utility function was assumed to be 90% of per-worker food
consumption in 1885 and that the implied asymptotic food share 1, calculated from (6.10), was 0.142. If,
instead, we assume d1 to be 50% of the 1885 per-worker food consumption, the implied asymptotic food
share is 1 = 0:255. Simulation results for this case are summarized in the second row of Table 6. With or
without the barrier, weakening Engel’s law does not materially change results, except that, predictably,
agriculture’s unconstrained employment share in the early years of the prewar period is lower.
We also tried three further variations of the model with the barrier: (i) assume t (the tax rate on
capital income) to be constant at the prewar average of 30.8%, (ii) change the projected TFP growth rate
(for t = 1941;1942;:::) for sector 2 from 1.66% to 5%, and (iii) assume that the surge in sector 2’s TFP after
1914 shown in Figure 5 did not take place by setting the growth rate of TFP2t from 1915 on at 1.09%,
the average growth rate from 1885 to 1914. Simulation results for (i) and (ii) are very similar to the base
case. In particular, the investment boom during the interwar years predicted by the model with the
barrier but not observed in data, shown in Figure 7, is still there. The simulated capital stock for (ii) is
lower than in the base case by more than 5% only for the ﬁnal 4 years of the sample period of 1885-1940.
In the simulation for (iii), there is no interwar investment boom, with the capital stock slightly higher
for several years before 1915 and substantially lower from 1915 on. Therefore, the investment boom
predicted by the model is indeed due to the surge in sector 2’s TFP after 1914.
Results for the Small-Open Economy
Now drop the assumption that food is a nontraded good and assume that food is tradable. Unlike in the
closed-economy case with nontraded food, domestic expenditure (the sum of consumption, investment,
and government expenditure) is no longer constrained to equal (net) output. For discussions below, the
material balance for food, which is neither used for investment nor consumed by the government, is
net output (i.e., gross output   intermediate input to sector 2)
+ net imports = domestic consumption.
The country is now o the yoke of Engel’s law because food can be imported to pre-empt starvation. We
alsoassumethatthecountryisnotlargeenoughtoinﬂuencethetermsoftrade, whichmeanstherelative
price of food, qt, is the exogenously given terms of trade for the country. We use the observed relative
price qt for the sample period of 1885-1940. To project qt beyond the sample period, we assume that its
34detrended value remains constant at its 1940 value.20 In terms of the detrended dynamical system, the
eect of this small-open economy assumption is that the resource constraint (4.25) (or, with intermediate
inputs, more precisely (A3.24)) is integrated with the market equilibrium condition for sector 1 output
and becomes (A4.1) of Appendix 4.
Turning to simulation results for this small open-economy version of the model, the eect of opening
uptotradedependsonwhetherthelaborbarrierisinplaceornot: thetradegainisverymodestwiththe
barrier and huge without. With the barrier in place, agriculture’s high share of employment makes the
country nearly self-sucient in food. This corresponds to the fact noted earlier for the closed-economy
case that the model-determined relative price is close to the observed relative price. Consequently, the
summary simulation results with the barrier, shown in the third row of Table 6, are very similar to
the closed-economy case.21 In contrast, without the barrier, the same row of the table for the counter-
factual simulation shows that the relative price of food is so low that the country becomes specialized
almost completely in non-food production.22 A large-scale reallocation of labor from agriculture to
non-agriculture triggered by a lifting of the barrier raises greatly the production eciency measured by
the overall TFP. The gain in real GNP from lifting the barrier is 67%, far larger than the 33% gain for the
closed-economy case.
A Large Gain from Trade?
To illustrate this drastic eect of opening up to free trade, consider Figure 12, which contains the same
production frontiers as in Figure 11. The black circle is the consumption vector and the white circle is
net output, both from the simulation with the barrier for the small open-economy version of the model.
Unlike in the closed-economy case, the two circles are not lined up vertically because now food is traded
(see the material balance equation shown above). The gray circle represents the vector of expenditures
(consumption for good 1 and the sum of consumption, investment, and government expenditure for
good 2). The net-output vector is to the right of the consumption and expenditure vectors, so the model
is predicting that, consistent with the data shown in Table 3 for 1885, the country in 1885 was a net
exporter of agricultural products. The slope of the line (not shown) connecting the white and gray circles
20Simulation results are not very sensitive to the projected value for qt.
21The prewar average for GNP of 1.015 is slightly lower than that for the closed-economy case of 1.042 because the
relativepriceisdierent(recallthattherelativepriceintheclosed-economycaseisendogenous). Therepresentative
agent’s discounted utility sum is higher for the small open-economy case than for the closed-economy case.
22Sector 1 (agriculture) does not disappear completely thanks to decreasing returns to scale.
35is the observed relative price of food or the terms of trade, with the white circle representing net output
being the point of tangency.
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The three triangles in the ﬁgure summarize the counter-factual simulation (without the barrier) for
1885. The black triangle is the consumption vector, while the net-production vector, indicated by the
white triangle, is far away, in the north-west segment of the production frontier without the barrier.
Net output of good 1 is negative; food imports are used not only for domestic food consumption but
also as an intermediate input to sector 2. The slope of the dotted line connecting the net-output vector
(the white triangle) and the expenditure vector (the gray triangle) is the observed relative price of food,
which is the terms of trade faced by the country.23 The counter-factual simulation predicts that Japan
would have been a huge exporter of good 2.
Given the lack of curvature of the production frontier without the barrier and given the terms of
trade that is greater than the near-constant slope of the frontier, we ﬁnd the prediction of the small
open-economy version of the model of a virtual disappearance of agriculture unlikely. Probably, the
23GNPintermsofgood2istheinterceptofthisdottedline. Thatis,ifYisgrossoutput,qt(Y1t M2t)+(Y2t M1t K2t)
equals qt(1   1)Y1t + [(1   2)Y2t   K2t] because qtM2t = 2Y2t and M1t = qt1Y1t.
36prewar international trade environment is better modeled as one in which the terms of trade even for
a then-small country such as Japan responds to the volume of trade. An increase in exports of good 2
by Japan would drive up the relative price of food, which should reduce the terms of trade and place
the net-production vector closer to the middle ﬂat part of the frontier. If so, the huge trade gain under
the small-country assumption found for the counterfactual simulation would not have materialized. We
thereforeconcludethatwhetherfoodisanontradedgoodornotwouldnotgreatlyaectthequantitative
eect of lifting the barrier, although it would surely aect the pattern of the country’s specialization.
8. Why Did the Barrier Exist?
In this section, we explore reasons for the existence of the lower bound for agricultural employment,
which we have taken for granted so far.
The Cityward Movement of the Peasant
In prewar Japan, as already emphasized, agricultural employment was virtually constant at 14 million.
Related facts about prewar Japan are the following.
 The number of farm households (households whose head’s main occupation is farming) was constant
at 5.5 million24 and the population in those farm households was constant at 30 million or about 5.5
persons per household throughout the prewar era.25 Because there was virtually no migration from
thecity,26 theconstancyofthenumberoffarmhouseholdsimpliesthattheheadofthefarmhousehold
24The sources are the tables in the Annual Department of Agriculture Tabulations and the censuses at various years.
25See Appendix 1 for the method used in the LTES to estimate the number of farm households.
26See Takagi (1956) and Taeuber (1957, pp. 126-127, particularly nootnote 8) for census data and various other
sources on the population supporting the lack of reverse migration from the city. One major non-census evidence is
a classic study on the cityward movement of the peasant by Nojiri (1942). Based on voluminous data collected from
ﬁeld work, he concludes (see Section 1, Chapter 2 of Part 1) that the incidence of a household head (and hence the
entire household) leaving the village for the city is negligible when compared to the number of non-head household
members doing the same. A survey cited in Namiki (1957, Section 3) reports that in 18 villages between 1899 and
1916 there were only 21 households whose head changed occupations from agriculture. Since, as shown by these
studies, there was virtually no attrition of farm households and since the number of farm households was constant,
we can conclude that there was no reverse movement of individuals from the city. There was a fair amount of
regional variation in the distribution of farm households, with Hokkaido (the northernmost island previously only
sparsely populated) gaining at the expense the Kinki area (where Kyoto and Osaka are located). This merely implies
37was almost always succeeded by one of its children upon its death or retirement.27
 Prewar fertility rate in rural areas was about 5.28 As shown in Honda (1950), it follows by simple
algebra from the constancy of the number of farm households and the relatively small household size
of 5.5 that all children except for the heir and its spouse left the village.29
 Primogeniture was prevalent at least in rural areas. Inheritance was impartible and the entire estate
went to one of the sons (usually the eldest son) who also succeeded the father’s occupation as a
farmer.30
that there was migration from one rural area to another.
27That the occupation as farmer is inherited from one generation to the next is quite well known in Japanese
agricultural economics, but there is no ocial statistics on social mobility directly documenting it. There is a survey
called the “SSM (Social Stratiﬁcation and Social Mobility) Survey” conducted every ten years since 1955 by the
Institute of Social Science of University of Tokyo, which asks the respondent about the father’s occupation (among
otherthings). Sato (1998, Appendix2) reportsthatabout 90% (650in number) of732 respondentsborn between 1896
and 1925 who were currently in agriculture at the times of the survey replied that their father was in agriculture.
The remaining 10% probably entered agriculture after the war. Between 1945 and 1949, when the majority of the
population had diculty getting enough to eat, agricultural employment increased from slightly below 14 million
to nearly 17 million.
28See, e.g., the table on the gross reproduction rate by industrial type reported on p. 246 (right below Table 96) in
Taeuber (1958). The prewar urban fertility rate was about 4.
29The infant mortality rate was such that only 4 of 5 children survive into adulthood. Assuming that a generation
is 27 years, a natural increase of 4 adults occurs in about 200 thousand (= 5.5 million/27) households, and in equally
numeroushouseholdsanaturaldecreaseof2adults(deathoftwooldparents)occurseveryyear. That’sanaturalnet
annualincreaseof400thousandpersons(=80thousandless40thousand). Ineachofthose200thousandhouseholds,
two of the four adult children succeed their deceased parents and remain in the village. Those two successors are
the heir (one of the sons, usually the eldest) and a daughter who came from a dierent farm household as his wife.
The remaining two children leave the household well before the death of their parents but not immediately after
ﬁnishing primary education.
30As far as we know, there is no direct prewar evidence for the impartibility for farm households. The prewar
CivilCodestipulatesimpartibleinheritancetobethedefaultmode, namely, thenextheadinheritthewholeproperty
if the current head died without leaving a will. In the early postwar period, out of the concern that the new Civil
Code, which stipulates equal division of the estate as the default mode, would result in widespread subdivision of
farmland, a quasi-government body conducted a series of surveys on the inheritance of the farmland. The earliest
such survey, conducted between January 1948 and August 1949 with the help of local governments, collected about
33 thousand cases of the inheritance of the farmland. Matsumura (1957) reports that one child inherited the entire
farmland in 84.7% of those cases. A 1978 survey also asked 5,326 farmers over the age of 60 about their intention
regarding inheritance. 79% of them said they would leave the entire farmland to the heir, according to a report by
Zenkoku Nogyo Kaigisho (1979). Therefore, impartible inheritance was the norm even under the new Civil Code.
It would have been more prevalent in the prewar era when the Civil Code made it the default mode of inheritance.
38 There was a large rural-urban disparity in household income. Kazushi Ohkawa (1955, Chapter 1) was
probably the ﬁrst to verify this long-alleged fact on a national account basis. The LTES shows that
value added per employment in agriculture is only 1/5 to 1/3 of that in non-agriculture in the prewar
era. A series of work by Ryoshin Minami (collected in Minami (1973)) ﬁnds an increasing disparity
between manufacturing and agriculture in wages and productivities in prewar Japan. For example,
Figure 10 of Minami (1973) shows that the ratio of the average male wage income in manufacturing
for establishments with 30 or more employees to the average male wage income for farm laborer on
yearly contracts rises from slightly above 2 in 1902 to about 4.5 in 1933. For females, the rise is much
less pronounced, but the ratio stays above 1, between 1.5 and 2.0.31
 Thesteep postwar declinein agricultural employmentafter 1955 (seeFigure3) wasinitiated by young
cohorts. In his perceptive essay on postwar employment in agriculture, Namiki (1957), drawing on
data from the 1955 census and other sources, noticed that the decline was concentrated in the 14-19
age bracket. His speculation, which was proved correct by time, was that the youth defecting to the
city include eldest sons, who in the prewar tradition are expected to succeed their fathers’ occupation
as farmer.
Why Did Agricultural Employment Remain Constant?
Given the large rural-urban income disparity in prewar Japan, we are not surprised that household
members not designated as heir left agriculture. The mystery is why the son designated as heir (and his
wife) stayed in agriculture. An explicit calculation of farm and urban incomes relevant for the peasant
contemplating on migration was given by Masui (1969). He notes that for a son and his prospective
wife the comparison should be between farm labor income for both the son and his wife combined and
Regarding the succession by eldest son, available evidence from non-government surveys shows that it was less
prevalent than might have been commonly assumed. For example, Tsuburai (1998, Table 6) ﬁnds that, in the 1965
and 1995 waves of the SSM Survey mentioned in footnote 27, about 57% of those respondents born between 1896
and 1925 who succeeded the father’s occupation as a farmer (246 persons) were the eldest son. Nojiri (1942) ﬁnds
that, in his ﬁeld work data covering 20 villages and about ten thousand farm households, 23% of those males who
left the village were eldest sons (see his Table 225).
31The ratio is based on nominal wage incomes. According to LTES (see Chapter 5 of Volume 8), it is hard to obtain
information on prices in rural areas. Nevertheless, Minami and Ono (1977) utilize their own estimate of the rural
consumer price level to calculate real wages. Visual inspection of their Figure 1 shows that prices were cheaper in
rural areas by 20 to 25% in the 1910s and 1920s, but the price dierence shrank since then and almost vanished by
1935.
39urban labor income for the son only because the wife’s employment opportunity in the city was severely
limited in the prewar era. Furthermore, if the son is the heir, his farm income should also include
imputed rentfromthe farm propertyhe would eventually inherit. Masui’s calculation for 1923-39 shows
that the heir’s farm income, with wife’s labor income and imputed rent ﬁgured in and with an allowance
for dierence in rural and urban price levels, is less than urban income for 1928-37.
Besides the issue of why peasants didn’t leave the village during those depressed years, three
questions can be raised about Masui’s thesis. First, the heir could sell the inherited farmland and live in
the city to collect the higher urban income. However, to prevent this, the father could require the son to
remain on the farm until he inherits the land. By the time his son inherits the estate, it may be too late
for him to start a career in the city.32
Second,theremaynothavebeenmuchtoinheritfortheheirtoasharecropper. AccordingtoMomose
(1990, p. 149), the right to cultivate had a property value, between 10% and 30% of the value of land.
Even if the cultivation right is transferable from father to son (which we don’t know is the case), the
property value may not have been large enough to make up for the rural-urban income disparity for
tenant farmers. To the extent that it was not, it is dicult to explain on purely economic grounds why
tenant farmers, comprising about 30% to 40% of all farm households,33 did not leave agriculture.
Third,aspointedoutbyNamiki(1957),thelandreforminstitutedbySCAP(theSupremeCommander
of the Allied Powers, namely Douglas MacArthur) in 1951, which transferred land ownership to tenant
farmers, should have made it more attractive for previous tenant farmers to stay in agriculture in the
postwar period. The postwar large-scale defection to the city took place despite the land reform.
Our explanation of the constancy of agricultural employment is an elaboration of Namiki’s (1957)
conjecture that the economic forces favoring migration to the city, which had been held in check by
patriarchy in the prewar era, were let loose in the years following the defeat of Japan. To appreciate his
logic, it is necessary to understand the nature of patriarchy that regulated the behavior of individuals in
prewar Japan through the Civil Code. The distinguishing feature of the prewar Civil Code (as opposed
to the new postwar Civil Code) is its recognition of the institution called the ie (sometimes translated
“house”) and its headship. The ie is “a ‘stem family’ — an organization that transcended its present
32This argument was suggested to me by Andrew Foster.
33According to the agricultural department tabulations mentioned in footnote 24. The percentage is substantially
higher if those owner farmers who also cultivates someone else’s land are included.
40members through history and spanned generations through the eldest son” (Ramseyer (1996, p. 82)).34
Vogel (1967, pp. 92-94) describes the ie in the context of the cityward migration mentioned above:
The ie is a patrilineal organization with rapid segmentation in each generation. One son, usually
the ﬁrst, inherits all the family property, including land, home, and ancestral treasures. Daughters
enter their husband’s ie upon marriage, and sons who do not succeed in their parents’ ie can either
be adopted as heirs in families with no sons or start relatively independent “branch” lineages of
their own ie. .... Because one son remained in the rural area and inherited the family property, the
ie was maintained and remained the basic unit of rural organization. Sometimes it was the ﬁrst son
who migrated to the city, but in any case the head of the ie has remained remarkably powerful in
deciding who would and would not go to the city.
As we mentioned already, those sons not designated as heir to the headship left the village for a good
economic reason, and it would also have been the head’s wish anyway, since the size of the farmland
the family owns (or the family has the right to cultivate) would not have been enough to support those
“excess sons”.35 Why did the heir remain in the village and how was he able to ﬁnd a bride? The power
of the head sanctioned by the prewar Civil Code explains it. According to Oda (1992, p. 232), under the
Code “the head of the family had the power to designate the place where family members should live, to
control their choice of marriage-partner and to expel them from the family when necessary.”36 Takeyoshi
Kawashima, a prominent legal scholar in Japan, notes that the peasant life before the introduction of the
Civil Code in 1898 did not quite honor the sort of patriarchy described in the Code (Kawashima (1957,
pp. 8-9, 46)). He then notes, however, that the Code, along with the indoctrination by the government
(muchlikethesortpracticedinNorthKoreatoday, weimagine)wherebyeveryschoolchildwasrequired
34For a more detailed description of ie by a westerner, see Taeuber (1958, Chapter VI).
35The annual department of agriculture tabulations mentioned in footnote 24 show that the size distribution of
land managed by farm households was remarkably equal and stable, with 50% to 60% concentrated in the 0.5-2.0ha
bracket. How to feed second and third sons without subdividing the family plot of land was a major issue in
Japanese agricultural economics in the very early postwar period.
36Relevant articles of the prewar Civil Code are the following (copied from Ramseyer (1996, Chapter 5)). Article
749: “members of a house may not determine their place of residence, if the head of the house objects to their
choice”; article 750(a): “In order for a family member to marry or to enter an adoptive relationship, he or she must
obtain the consent of the family head”; article 750(b): “If a family member marries or enters an adoptive relationship
in violation of the previous subsection, the head may, within one year of the date of such marriage or adoption,
expel such member from the family or refuse his or her reentry into the family”; article 772(a) states that until man
and woman reach the statutory age — thirty for men, twenty-ﬁve for women — they could marry only if both of
their parents consented.
41to study a textbook (called Kyoiku Chokugo, see Figure 13 which is the front page of a textbook wide in
use in 1890) expounding on obedience to the father and to the emperor, must have made a profound
inﬂuence, particularly on the peasant population as can be surmised, for example, from the decline of
peasant rebellions since the end of the 19th century.37 The heir stayed in the village, and a daughter
married into a farm household, because it was what father wished.
Figure 13: How Children were Indoctrinated
This explanation of the constancy of agricultural employment in prewar Japan also explains its steep
postwar decline. A new Constitution was adopted in 1947 and there was a wholesale revision of the
Civil Code under the direction of SCAP. Article 24 of the new Constitution states that “....With regard
37Kawashima (1957, p. 10, and Chapter 1, particularly pp. 46-47). Ramseyer (1996, Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter
5) argues that the prewar Civil Code did not confer the head the power to control residence and marriages of the
family members. However, the court cases he cites are not about disputes between the head and the heir, and the
census data he cites for his point that family members did not stay in the family (which means the head’s threat to
expel had no bite) actually reinforces our claim that all the non-heir siblings left the stem household.
42to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile,... laws shall be enacted from the
standpoint of individual dignity ...”. The new Civil Code no longer recognizes the ie and the dictatorial
power of the head. School textbooks were rewritten to fully reﬂect those changes. It is not surprising at
all, then, that the large-scale defection to the city since around 1955 was initiated by young cohorts, who
were not subject to the prewar indoctrination of the supremacy of the ie over the individual. Reinforcing
the tide to the city was the fact that the new Civil Code encourages equal division while the old Code
facilitated (but did not require) primogeniture. Now the eldest son who inherits the entire estate by
the will of his father is obligated to pay the other siblings a minimum claim (half of what they would
have received under the default mode of inheritance (i.e., equal division)), which certainly makes it less
economically attractive for the eldest son to stay in the village.
9. Conclusion
According to the standard Lewisian theory of development, the supply curve of industrial labor is
horizontal and the cityward movement of the peasant is limited only by demand. We argued for prewar
Japan that the rural-to-urban migration was limited by supply. Prewar Japan is certainly not the only
case in history of a large and persistent rural-urban income disparity. Even today, the disparity can be
observed for a large number of developing countries.38 Our model of a dual economy may be applicable
to those countries as well. Their per-capita income is low because they have their own version of the
labor barrier.
The quantitative implication of our theory is big time. In terms of per-worker GNP, Japan was 71% of
the U.S. in 1990 and 36% on average during the prewar period of 1885-1940. According to our two-sector
model, Japan’s prewar GNP per worker would have been higher by 33% if the labor barrier were absent.
In this sense, our dual economy model accounts 12 (= 36  0:33) percentage points, or about a third, of
the U.S.-Japan gap of 35 (= 71   36) percentage points. We argued that the rest of the gap is due mostly
to the rapid postwar TFP growth outside agriculture.
Japanese Manufacturing TFP went up, once during the interwar period, and another time during
the postwar high-growth period. Exploring reasons why the rapid TFP growth took place when it did
is obviously a major future research topic. Hints abound. Hayami and Ogasawara (1999) and Godo
38See, e.g., a documentation by Vollrath (2005) using an ILO database.
43and Hayami (2002) argue that a threshold level of average educational level was reached in the interwar
period so that foreign advanced technology could be proﬁtably adopted. Braun, Okada, and Sudou
(2005) ﬁnd a close connection in the postwar period between U.S. R&D expenditure and Japanese TFP
growth three years after. Gordon (2004) documents that the rapid technological catch-up occurred in
postwar Europe as well. Another, perhaps more concrete, research topic is to explain why the interwar
capital accumulation predicted by theory didn’t occur. We conjectured that the rapid cartelization in the
1930s must have had something to do with it.
We end by responding to two criticisms raised to us on the constancy of agricultural employment.
 Some argued that the lack of mechanization in rice production in prewar Japan could explain the
constancy. The introduction of the tractor started only after 1955 and mechanization of other tasks
such as rice planting and rice reaping didn’t start until the mid 1960s in Japan. If the prewar
agricultural technology was like the Leontief technology with limited substitutability between land
areaandlabor, itwouldexplaintheconstancyofagriculturalemployment. However, thisexplanation
is inconsistent with the well-documented fact that the rural-urban income disparity was very large
in prewar Japan. Furthermore, it is a long tradition of agricultural economics (see, e.g., Hayami
(1975)) to admit substantial substitutability between land, labor, and capital, as in the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
 The barrier may have existed in the city, not in the countryside, in the form of inadequate urban
housing and infrastructure. This, however, does not explain why the scale of the cityward emigration
was such that the population left behind in the countryside remained constant. Virtually every
non-heir child left for the city, the living condition in the city such as it was.
44Appendix 1: Data Description
This appendix describes the construction of the variables used in the text. It consists of three parts.
The ﬁrst part covers the prewar period. The postwar values, which are used only in the standard growth
accounting, are described in the second part. The third part is about U.S. GNP. The raw data, the
constructed series along with the formula used for construction, and a complete list of data sources are
in an Excel ﬁle downloadable from http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Hayashi-Prescott2.htm.
1. Prewar
The basic source of prewar macro variables for Japan (except for hours worked and income accounts) is
thefourteen-volumeseriesentitledtheLongTermEconomicStatistics(hereafterLTES),whichisaconsistent
system of national income accounts compiled by a group of academics aliated with Hitotsubashi
University led by Kazushi Ohkawa. It contains not only data series but also a detailed documentation
of data sources and derivations. An English summary of the LTES is Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979)
(hereafter OS), which for some LTES series contains updates. If the series is updated in OS, we use the
updated series in OS instead of the older series in LTES. Many prewar series in the LTES start before
1885, but the ﬁrst year for which GNP is available is 1885. We therefore take 1885 to be the ﬁrst year in
our analysis. Real series in the LTES are in 1934-36 prices.
AsinHayashiandPrescott(2002),wedon’trecognizethegovernmentcapitalstock,soallgovernment
expenditures,includingthoseclassiﬁedasgovernmentinvestment(grossgovernmentcapitalformation),
are expensed in our accounting framework. The agricultural sector (the ﬁrst sector) in our analysis is
agriculture proper, exclusive of forestry and ﬁshery. Our deﬁnition of agriculture proper is the same as
in LTES. It is the set of industries that produce the following agricultural goods:
rice, wheat, barley, rye, oats, miscellaneous cereals, potatoes, pulses, vegetables, fruits & nuts,
industrial crops, green manure & forage crops, sericulture products, livestock & poultry, and straw
goods.
The non-agriculture sector (the second sector) is the rest of the economy. The boundary of Japan in
our study is that of Japan proper that excludes former colonies.
Sectoral employment and hours worked: conceptual issues. The deﬁnition of sectoral employment in
the LTES is the same as that in the Censuses. Thus, employment in agriculture, E1, refers to the
number of persons whose primary occupation is agriculture. For those in agriculture and for those in
farm households but not in agriculture, prewar documents (the Censuses and available surveys by
the Agricultural Ministry of the Japanese government) do not indicate the fraction of their time spent
in agriculture, so we have no choice but to assume that those whose primary occupation is agriculture
work full time in agriculture and those whose primary occupation is not agriculture do not spend
any time at all in agriculture. That is, we calculate total hours in agriculture as h1E1 (where h1 is
hours worked if one works full time in agriculture). There is, however, a survey by the Ministry of
AgriculturedoneinApril1946thatclassiﬁesfarmpopulationintocategoriesroughlyindicativeofthe
degree of participation in agriculture. Appendix Table 1 is a summary of it. If we apply the Census
45deﬁnition, employment in agriculture (E1) is 17.443 (= 14:470+1:849+1:033+0:091) million persons,
1.94 millions of which spend up to half of their work hours outside agriculture.39 Despite this, our
calculation of total hours worked when applied to 1946 assumes that those 1.94 million people work
full time, h1 hours (see below for how h1 (hours worked in agriculture) is estimated). The table also
indicates that the census deﬁnition would include 3.0 (= 2:165+0:835) millions who spend up to half
of their work hours in agriculture as part of E2 (employment outside agriculture). Our calculation
when applied to 1946 assumes that those 3 million people in E2 work full time, h2 hours. Because
(at least in this 1946 survey) there are more people primarily but not fully in non-agriculture (3.00
million) than those primarily but not fully in agriculture (1.94 million), our total hours worked in
agriculture (h1E1) would understate true total hours. However, it is possible that those who answered
in the survey that they work full time in agriculture may have spent some time during agricultural
o seasons working in the city to supplement household income.40
Appendix Table 1: Composition of Family Members at Farm Households in Million Persons
full time in agriculture 14:470
primarily in agriculture 1:849 Work at the farm of residence
primarily in non-agriculture 2:165
full time in agriculture 1:033
primarily in agriculture 0:091 Work o the farm of residence
primarily in non-agriculture 0:835
Dependents 14:723
Total 34:240 million
Note: The source if Survey of Agricultural Population conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in April 1946.
Reprinted on p. 9 of Handbook of Agricultural Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 1950.
Data sources for E1;E2. Fortheprewarcensusyearsof1920,30,and40,thedataonsectoralemployment
in the LTES are directly from those Censuses. For other years, the LTES estimates employment in
agricultureastheproductofthenumberoffarmhouseholdsandthenumberofpersonsinagriculture
perfarmhousehold. From1906on,thereisanannualocialseriesonthenumberoffarmhouseholds.
The LTES estimates pre-1906 values from various sources. Regarding the number of persons in
agriculture per farm household, it can be obtained for 1920, 1930, and 1940 from the Censuses for
those years, and for 1879 and 1887 from Census-type information available for two prefectures. The
LTES estimates values for all other years by linear interpolation. E1 (employment in agriculture) thus
39The ﬁgure of more than 17 million is much higher than the prewar constant of 14 million, because there was a
reverse emigration from urban to rural during the aftermath of World War II, with people looking for ways to feed
themselves.
40Prewar Censuses collected some information on subsidiary jobs. For example, the 1920 Census shows that
about 6.4 million of those 13.9 million in agriculture have subsidiary jobs (see LTES, Vol. 2, Table 29). However, it
is not clear what fraction of subsidiary jobs held by 6.4 million people is outside agriculture. For example, if a rice
grower spends a fraction of his time in producing sericulture products (another agricultural product), he is deemed
to have a secondary job in the 1920 Census (see, LTES, Vol. 2, p. 160).
46estimated is from LTES, Vol. 9, Table 33, which reports the constancy of agricultural employment
at 14 million. However, Table A18 of OS (Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979)), which was published 13
years after LTES Volume 9, shows that agricultural employment was higher, nearly 16 million, until
1914 and that it declined by about 2 million to about 14 million during the interwar years between
1914 and 1918. However, Mataji Umemura, who wrote the chapter on population and employment
in OS on which Table A18 is based, was the lead author of LTES Volume 2 (on labor force), which was
published in 1988. Its Table 10 shows a series on agricultural employment that is almost identical to
the series in Table 33 of Volume 9. Total employment is available for 1885-1920 (1920 was the ﬁrst
year a national census was taken) in Vol. 2, Table 5 and for 1920-1940 in Vol. 2, Table 6. We use the
Vol. 2, Table 5 series to extrapolate the Table 6 series back from 1920 to 1885. E2, employment outside
agriculture, is obtained by subtracting E1 from total employment.
h1;h2 (hours worked) For agriculture, an estimate of total days worked per year for 1874-1977 is in
Shintani (1981). It is the sum of the days worked in the production of various crops and livestock.
See pp. 23-24 of Hayami (1975) for a discussion of the details and limitations of this type estimate.
Dividing this by E1 gives an estimate of days worked per year per worker. Let xt be this variable for
year t. Hours worked per week for year t, h1t, in agriculture is calculated as: (xt=x1948) times 48.4.
This ﬁgure of 48.4 hours is the average hours worked in agriculture & forestry for 1948 for workers
14 years or older in the postwar Labor Force Survey and reported in Table 3-14, Volume 1 of Japan
Statistical Association (1986). (The Labor Force Survey is a survey on individals, not on establishments,
conducted and published by the Statistics Bureau of the Management and Coordination Agency of
the Japanese government.) Therefore, we are assuming that hours worked per day in agriculture
had been constant from 1885 to 1948. Estimating h2 is even more problematical. There is a survey,
reproduced in Volume 10 of Rodo Undo Shiryo Iinkai (1959), on factories with 10 or more workers for
days worked per year (for 1906-1918) and hours worked per day (for 1909-1918). The hours worked
per day are in integers. The ﬁgure is 11 except in 1917 when it is 12 hours. We set the 1917 ﬁgure
to 11 to avoid a discontinuous change in total hours worked. For 1909-1918, h2 is set equal to the
implied total hours per year divided by 52. For 1906-1908, h2 is calculated similarly except that hours
worked per day is assumed to be 11 hours (the 1909 value from the above source). The same volume
reports a separate survey on factory workers for days worked per month and hours worked per day
for 1923-1941. Thus for 1923-41 h2 is set equal to the implied total hours per month divided by 31/7.
For 1885-1905, h2 is set to the 1906 value, and for 1919-1922, h2 is set to the 1923 value.
N (working-age population) The population aged 15 or older in millions, from LTES, Vol. 2, Table 1.
Y1;Y2 (value added in two sectors), p1;p2 (their deﬂators), q (relative price), real private GNP. Sincewe
don’t recognize government capital while LTES does, to obtain nominal private GNP we need to sub-
tract depreciation due to government capital from the LTES estimate of nominal GNP (Vol. 1, Table
1). The government portion of depreciation is calculated as: s (government’s share of total capi-
tal stock) times total depreciation (from Vol. 1, Table 6). This s is calculated as the ratio of gross
government capital stock (available from a database maintained at Hitotsubashi University’s website
http://rcisss.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/cgi-bin/Ltes,asseriesJK102__001)togrossprivatecapitalstock
(OS, Table A42). The implicit GNP deﬂator is the ratio of LTES nominal GNP to its real counterpart
(GNP in 1934-36 prices, OS, Table A3). Real private GNP is obtained by dividing nominal private
47GNP obtained above by this implicit GNP deﬂator. Y1, real value added in agriculture in 1934-36
prices, is from OS, Table A17. It is a revision of the estimate in the LTES (Vol. 9, Table 4). p1, the
implicit deﬂator for Y1, is the ratio of nominal value added (OS, Table A16) to the real value added.
Y2 is real private GNP less Y1. (Therefore, real private GNP equals Y1 + Y2.) Similarly, nominal Y2 is
nominal private GNP less nominal value added in agriculture. p2, the implicit deﬂator for Y2, is the
ratio of nominal Y2 to Y2. The relative price equals p1=p2.
Share of intermediate inputs in sector 1 The value added ratio (the ratio of value added to gross out-
put) for agriculture is available for each year (OS, Table A16). As discussed in the text on calibration,
this is used to translate value added to gross production for sector 1, and the parameter 1 is deﬁned
as 1 minus the average over 1885-1940 of this value added ratio.
K1;K2 (real physical capital stocks) To obtain real capital stocks, we ﬁrst calculate nominal capital
stocks. The LTES has real net capital stocks (in 1934-36 prices) by asset type (plants & livestock,
equipments, and structures) for the entire economy and also for agriculture (see the Excel ﬁle men-
tioned above for their source). It also has nominal and real investment (gross capital formation) by
asset for the private sector and for agriculture. From nominal and real investments, we calculate the
implicit deﬂator by asset for both the private sector and agriculture. Nominal private capital stock is
calculated as s (the private share, deﬁned above) times the nominal value of the capital stock for the
entire economy, calculated from real capital stocks by asset and the implicit deﬂators just described.
Nominal capital stock for agriculture is calculated from real capital stocks by asset and the implicit
deﬂatorsforagriculturejustdescribed. Nominalcapitalstockfornon-agriculture(sector2)isnominal
private capital stock less nominal agriculture capital stock. K1 (real capital stock for sector 1, agricul-
ture) is the ratio of nominal capital stock for agriculture to p2 (the implicit deﬂator for sector 2, already
described). K2 (real capital stock for sector 2) is the ratio of nominal capital stock for non-agriculture
to p2. We divide nominal capital stocks by the same deﬂator, p2, because in our theoretical model only
sector 2 output can be used for investment.
TFP1t, TFP2t (TFP for two sectors) With intermediate inputs, the TFPs refer to the TFPs in the gross
production functions with intermediate inputs (6.3). Given the calibrated parameter values for
(1;1;) for sector 1, and given the time-series data on Y1t (value added), L1t, and K1t, we calculate
g TFP1t by (A3.8) (note that the Y in Appendix 3 is gross output, which we calculate as the ratio of value
added to (1 1)). We then recover TFP1t by (A3.9). Equivalently, we can substitute (A3.7) into (A3.1)
and solve for TFP1t. TFP2t is calculated similarly.
Consumption of two goods. Consumption by households of good 1 (agricultural products) in current
yen is from LTES, Vol. 6, Tables 5 and 6. It is deﬁned as the sum of: rice, wheat, barley, rye, oats,
miscellaneous cereals, potatoes, pulses, vegetables, fruits & nuts, dairy products. Total nominal
consumption is from Table 1 of OS (which is the same as the series in LTES, Vol. 1, Table 1). Nominal
consumption of good 2 is deﬁned as total nominal consumption less nominal consumption of good 1.
Exports and imports of agricultural goods. Nominal exports of agricultural goods is from LTES, Vol.
14, Table 1, column 10. It excludes ﬁshery and forestry. As mentioned in footnote 9 on p. 96 of this
volume, sericulture products (which is included in our deﬁnition of agricultural products displayed
above) are not included in column 10 of the Table and are treated as a manufactured good. Nominal
48imports of agricultural goods is from Table 2 of the same volume. In the table, ”agricultural products”
(column 10) consists of crude foodstu (column 10.1) and ”textile materials” (column 10.2). We use
column 10.1 for our estimate of imports, thus excluding textile materials from imports of agricultural
products. We do this because sericulture products are not included in agricultural exports (column
10 of Table 1 of the volume).
Foreign assets. We use the net claims on the rest of the world in Fujino and Teranishi (2000, pp. 550 and
553). Their estimate is based on available balance-sheet information.
 t (government share of sector 2 output) This is the ratio of nominal government expenditure to nomi-
nalgrossoutputofsector2. NominalgrossoutputiscalculatedasnominalvalueaddedY2 mentioned
above divided by (1   2) where 2 is the share of intermediate inputs. Government expenditure is
calculated as the sum of government consumption and government investment (both available from
LTES, Vol. 1, Table 1) minus the government component of nominal depreciation (already discussed
above in the context of calculating private GNP).
t (depreciation rate) The depreciation rate is calculated for each year. Given that we calculated real
capital stock by dividing nominal capital stock by p2, we would calculate t as the ratio of real
depreciation(deﬁnedasnominaldepreciationdividedbyp2)torealcapitalstock(attheendofprevious
year), or equivalently, as the ratio of nominal depreciation to nominal capital stock. However, this
ratio turned out to be more volatile (although the mean is similar) than the ratio of real depreciation
(in 1934-36 prices) to real capital stock in 1934-36 prices at the end of previous year. We take this
real-to-real ratio to be our t for year t. In calculating this ratio, both real depreciation and real capital
stock are for the economy as a whole, not for the private sector. This is because, as already mentioned,
the government components of depreciation and the capital stock are not available as data. t has an
upward trend; it increases from 2.8% for 1887 to 5.1% for 1940.
TAXt (tax on capital income) Revenue from capital income taxes is needed to calculate t, the tax rate
on capital income. The calculation of involves three steps. First, total tax revenue is divided into
three categories, direct taxes on persons, direct taxes on corporations, and indirect taxes. Second, the
land tax, which was a major revenue source in prewar Japan and which is included in indirect taxes,
is subtracted from indirect taxes. Third, the capital income tax revenue is deﬁned as: 0:1 (direct
taxes on persons) + (direct taxes on corporations) +0:5 (indirect taxes less the land tax). Regarding
the ﬁrst step, for 1930-40, Table 26 of Keizai Shingicho (1954) of the Japanese government reports this
three-way breakdown for 1930-50 and we take their ﬁgures. For 1885-1929, LTES, Vol. 7, Table 7b
has the three-way breakdown for the central government, while Table 7d divides total tax revenue
between direct taxes (with no further breakdown between personal and corporate taxes) and indirect
taxes. We use the shares of personal and corporate taxes in national direct taxes to divide local direct
taxes between personal and corporate taxes. Regarding the second step, Japan Statistical Association
(1986) reports the land tax for the central government for all sample years. For local governments,
the primary data source on government ﬁnance in general is Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo, an annual publication
on local public ﬁnance by the Interior Ministry of the Japanese government. It has data on the land
tax collected by local governments, but it is available only from 1901, and our library (the University
of Tokyo economics department library) has it only from 1903. For 1885-1902, the local land tax is
49calculated as: LTES series on local indirect taxes times the ratio of the local land tax for 1903 available
from Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo to the 1903 value of the LTES series.
t (tax rate on capital income) Having calculated revenue from capital income, we need the tax base to
calculate t. We assume that for tax purposes the replacement cost depreciation can be deducted from
gross capital income. Thus the tax base for year t is calculated by the formula
(rt   t)p2t(K1t + K2t)
= rtp2t(K1t + K2t)   tp2t(K1t + K2t)





















p2tK2t   tp2t(K1t + K2t) (by (4.14) and (4.15))
= 1p1tY1t + 2p2tY2t   tp2t(K1t + K2t)   p2tK2t; (since qt = p1t=p2t)
where, as already deﬁned, pjt is the deﬂator for sector j output, Yjt is real value added in sector j, j
is the capital share in sector j, Kjt is real capital stock in sector j (j = 1;2), t is the value added ratio
in sector 1, and  is the intermediation cost per unit of capital. The calibrated values for 1;2; are
shown in the text. t is calculated as the ratio of revenue from capital income taxes (TAX, already
discussed above) to the tax base shown above. The prewar mean is 30.8%. Although the calculation
of t requires  to be calibrated, calculation of t(rt   t), which is needed to calibrate  in (6.9) in the
text, does not. This can be seen from the above expression for the tax base. Since the tax base equals
(rt   t)p2t(K1t + K2t), we have
t(rt   t) =
TAXt
(rt   t)p2t(K1t + K2t)




Chained real GNP. Our construction of prewar real private GNP for year t in 1934-36 prices is already
described and is equal to Y1t + Y2t for all t. We also calculated chained real private GNP as the
chain-type Fisher quantity index. It is calculated as follows: its value for t = 1935 equals nominal
private GNP described above. GNP for other years are calculated using the Fisher quantity index.















The dierence between this chain index and Y1t + Y2t, however, is small. For example for 1885, the
former is 3,818 while the latter is 3,853. The implicit deﬂator associated with chained real private
GNP is the ratio of nominal private GNP to this chained GNP.
Minor details. We altered the LTES ﬁgures at three places. First, the real stock of structures for the
economy as a whole in 1934-36 prices (which we need to calculate private real capital stock, as
described above) exhibits a discontinuous jump from 1885 to 1886. This is because the series for non-
farm residential structures starts in 1886, not 1885 (see LTES, Vol. 3, Table 6). The LTES 1885 value of
50residential structures is replaced by x which is obtained by solving the perpetual inventory formula
for x: K1886 = (1   )x + I1885, where K1886 is residential structures at the end of 1886 in 1934-36 prices
and I1885 is real investment in residential structures from LTES. The depreciation rate for structures, 
here, is the average of the depreciation rate for 1886-1940 implied by the LTES series on real capital
stock and real investment through the perpetual inventory formula. Second, private real investment
in nonresidential structures for 1939 seemed too large for us. The 1939 value is assumed to be the
simple average of the 1938 and 1940 values. Third, the depreciation rates t calculated as described
above for 1885 and 1886 dier substantially from other years. We set t for t = 1885 and 1886 to 1887.
2. Extending Prewar Series to the Postwar Period
ThestandardgrowthaccountinginthetextrequiresseriesonY (realprivateGNP),K (realprivatecapital
stock including foreign assets), N (working-age population), and hE (total hours worked). Total hours
worked hE equals h1E1 + h2E2, where hi and Ei are average hours worked per week and employment in
sector i (i = 1;2). Following the one-sector analysis of Hayashi and Prescott (2002), real private capital
stock in the growth accounting in the text is deﬁned as nominal private capital stock (including foreign
assets) divided by the implicit GNP deﬂator P. We describe below how h1, E1, h2, E2, N, and nominal
private capital stock are extended to the postwar period and how Y (real GNP) and P (its deﬂator) are
deﬁned for the entire period 1885-2000. The primary data source for employment and hours worked is
the Labor Force Survey which, as mentioned above, is a survey on individuals. There is an establishment
survey on employment and hours worked (called the Monthly Labor Survey (Maitsuki Kinro Tokei Chousa
in Japanese)), but it does not cover agriculture.
Y (real private GNP) and P (its deﬂator) for 1885-2000. For 1885-1940, Y is the chain index described
above. Real GNP for 1930-1964 (except for 1945) is available from the 1966 White Paper on National
Income, the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese government. Y is extended from 1941 to
1956 (except for 1945) using this series. The dataset developed from Japanese national accounts
on the SNA68 basis (System of National Accounts on 1968 basis) in Hayashi and Prescott (2002),
downloadable from http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Hayashi-Prescott1.htm, has real private GNP
for 1956-2000. This series is used to extend Y from 1956 to 2000. P for 1885-1940 is the implicit deﬂator
associated with the chain index described above. Nominal private GNP is available from the above
Hayashi-Prescott dataset for 1956-2000. Nominal GNP for 1930-71 is available from LTES, Table 1A.
Nominal private GNP for 1941-55 (except for 1945) is calculated as the LTES nominal GNP times the
ratio of the Hayashi-Prescott nominal private GNP for 1956 to the LTES nominal GNP for 1956. P for
1941-2000 is the ratio of nominal private GNP to real private GNP.
N (working-age population) For postwar, N is deﬁned as population aged 20 or older. For 1947-1955,
Censusdataonpopulationbyageareavailableonlyfor1947, 1950, and1955(theirvaluesarereported
in Table 2-9, Volume 1 of Japan Statistical Association (1986)). N for intervening years are by linear
interpolation. From 1955 on, N is available annually from publications by the Statistics Bureau of the
Management and Coordination Agency of the Japanese government.
E1;E2 (employment in two sectors) The LTES series we used for prewar E1 (from LTES, Vol. 9, Table
33) actually extends to 1963. For 1941-47, E1 is the LTES series for 1941-1947. The Labor Force Survey
has employment for agriculture proper from 1970 on and for agriculture & forestry from 1948 on (the
51ﬁgure for the latter for 1948-85 are in Table 3-8, Volume 1 of Japan Statistical Association (1986)). For
1970-2004, E1 is this Labor Force Survey series for agriculture proper for 1970-2000. For 1948-69, E1
is calculated as the Labor Force Survey series for agriculture & forestry times x=y, where x here is
employment in agriculture proper and y is employment in agriculture & forestry, both for 1970 and
from the Labor Force Survey. E1 for 1948 thus calculated is 15.99 million. The LTES series for 1948
stands at 15.85 million. Data on E1 +E2 since 1948 are from the Labor Force Survey (we used the ﬁgures
reported in Table 3-8, Volume 1 of Japan Statistical Association (1986) for 1948-85). Workers in the
Labor Force Survey are 14 years or older for 1948-55 and 15 years or older thereafter.
h1;h2 (hours worked per week) h1 for 1948-2004 is average hours worked per week in agriculture &
forestry for workers from the Labor Force Survey. h2 for 1949-2004 is average hours worked per week
for workers outside agriculture & forestry, from the Labor Force Survey. Figures for 1948-85 are from
Table 3-14, Volume 1 of Japan Statistical Association (1986). Figures for recent years are in Table 10 of
the annual reports on the Labor Force Survey.
Nominal private capital stock (including foreign assets) Theend-of-yearvaluesfor1955-2000areavail-
able from the Hayashi-Prescott dataset mentioned above.
3. U.S. GNP
U.S. real GNP for 1929-2000 in chained 2000 dollars is taken from Table 7.1 of the NIPA (National Income
and Product Accounts, complied by the Bureau of Economic Analysis), which is a chain-type quantity
index using the Fisher formula. Extending back the series to 1885 is done using the Balke-Gordon series
available in Balke and Gordon (1989). Working-age population is population aged 16 or older for 1885-
1945 and aged 21 or older for 1946-2000. Population aged 16 or older for 1900-1945 is from Historical
Statistics of the United States. This series is extended back to 1885 using total population, also available
from the Historical Statistics. Population aged 21 or older for 1946-1970 is from the Historical Statistics.
This series is extended to 2000 by civilian noninstitutional population aged 20 or older available from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics website http://www.bls.gov/cps/.
52Appendix 2: Reducing Equilibrium Conditions to the
Two-Equation Dynamical System
This appendix describes in detail how the equilibrium conditions in Section 4 can be reduced to the
two-equation dynamical system.
 We ﬁrst reduce the equilibrium conditions except the employment arbitrage condition (4.4) and the
transversality condition (4.10) — the eleven equations (4.8), (4.9), (4.12), (4.13), (4.15), (4.16), (4.17)-
(4.21)—intosevenequations. DeﬁningsKt  K1t=(K1t+K2t), recallingthatsEt  E1t=Et and t  Gt=Y2t,
and substituting the Frisch demands (4.9) and the factor market equilibrium conditions (4.19)-(4.21)
into the rest of the eleven equations, we obtain
Ntc2(qt;t) + Nt+1kt+1   (1   t)Ntkt = (1    t)Y2t   Nt(1   sKt)kt; (A2.1)
t+1 = t[1 + (1   t+1)(rt+1   t+1)]; (A2.2)

















where, as before, Y1t and Y2t are given by (4.11) and (4.14), reproduced here for convenience:









 We now reduce these seven equations into six equations written in terms of detrended variables. To













; ˜ t 
t
XYt





A somewhat tedious algebra yields:
qtY1t = NtXYt ˜ qt ˜ y1t and Y2t = NtXYt ˜ y2t; (A2.10)
where






Et; ˜ y2t  ˜ k
2
t (1   sKt)2(1   sEt)1 2: (A2.11)






˜ kt+1 = [1   t   (1   sKt)]˜ kt + (1    t)˜ y2t  







˜ t+1 =  ˜ t
(




(1   sK;t+1)˜ kt+1
     t+1
#)
; (A2.13)
(market equilibrium for good 1)
˜ qtc1(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt
= ˜ qt ˜ y1t; (A2.14)
(equality of marginal products of capital) 1
˜ qt ˜ y1t
sKt˜ kt
+  = 2
˜ y2t





















 We now show that (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt) given (˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt) is uniquely determined by (A2.14)-(A2.16) and
(4.4), so that the equilibrium conditions reduce to the two-equation dynamical system (A2.12) and
(A2.13) in two variables (˜ kt; ˜ t). The graph of (4.4), which is a correspondence from income ratio
w1th1t
w2th2t to labor share sEt, is the staircase shown in Appendix Figure 1. This can be interpreted as the
supply curve of sector 1 labor. To derive a demand curve, we solve (A2.14) and (A2.15) for (˜ qt;sKt)
given (sEt; ˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt), and then substitute these solved-out values into (A2.16) to obtain
w1th1t
w2th2t as a
function of (sEt; ˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt). It is easy to show that the function is strictly decreasing in sEt, so the
graph of
w1th1t
w2th2t as a function of sEt is downward-sloping. This is the demand curve for sector 1 labor.
Three possible cases are drawn in Appendix Figure 1. In Case A, the demand curve intersects with
the vertical portion of the staircase (the graph of the arbitrage condition) at sEt = ¯ sEt. In thise case,
the labor barrier sEt  ¯ sEt is binding. Case B is that the intersection is on the horizontal portion of the
staircase. In this case,
w1th1t
w2th2t = 1, so from (A2.16) we have
1 =







The ﬁnal case, Case C, is that the demand curve intersects with the staircase at sEt = 1. In either
case, given (˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt), sEt is uniquely determined. Given (sEt; ˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt), (sKt; ˜ qt) is uniquely
determined by (A2.14) and (A2.15), as just explained.
54Figure 1: The Three Cases
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 InCaseC, sector1is soproductivethat allemploymentis inagriculture(which meansL2t = 0). Under
the calibrated parameter values and the initial conditions speciﬁed in the text about the model, this
case does not arise in any period. Assuming that only Case A and Case B are relevant, the value
of sEt satisfying (A2.14)-(A2.16), and (4.4) can be determined as follows. Notice from the previous
paragraph that in Case B (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt) solves (A2.14), (A2.15), and (A2.18). If Case C is impossible, then
Case A (where the labor barrier sEt  ¯ sEt is binding) obtains if and only if the sEt that solves these
three equations is less than ¯ sEt (this corresponds to point A’ in Appendix Figure 1). Therefore, to ﬁnd
(sKt;sEt; ˜ qt) that solves (A2.14)-(A2.16) and (4.4) given (˜ kt; ˜ t;XYt;XQt), we can proceed as follows:
1. Solve (A2.14),(A2.15), and (A2.18) for (sKt;sEt; ˜ qt). If sEt  ¯ sEt, then the solution is found.
2. If sEt < ¯ sEt, then set sEt = ¯ sEt and use (A2.14) and (A2.15) to solve for (sKt; ˜ qt) given sEt thus
determined.
55Appendix 3: Incorporating Intermediate Inputs
In this appendix, we allow each sector to use the output of the other sector as an intermediate input.
For this more general model, we derive a two-equation dynamical system, compute its steady state, and
show that the steady state is a saddle.
The Equilibrium Conditions
Start with sector 1 (agriculture). If M1t is the intermediate input from sector 2 to sector 1, the production
function for sector 1 is







The contribution of land is implicit in this production function, so we have a decreasing returns to scale
in capital, labor, and the intermediate input:
1 +  + 1 < 1: (A3.2)
The ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to K1t, L1t, and M1t for sector 1 are:






































Combining this with (A3.1) gives
















1t ; ˜ 1 
1
1   1




Substituting (A3.6) into the marginal productivity conditions (A3.3) and (A3.4) yields
rt = (1   1) ˜ 1 q
1
1 1





w1t = (1   1)˜ q
1
1 1





(A3.8) replaces (4.11), (A3.10) replaces (4.12), and (A3.11) replaces (4.13). Noting that an amount M1t =
1qtY1t of good 2 goes into sector 1, the equilibrium condition for good 2, (4.18), is now
(good 2) Ntc2t + (Nt+1kt+1   (1   t)Ntkt) + Gt + 1qtY1t = Y2t   K2t: (A3.12)
56Turning to sector 2, if M2t is the intermediate input from sector 2 to sector 1, the Cobb-Douglas
production function for sector 2 is







The constant-returns-to-scale assumption for sector 2 implies
2 + 2 + 2 = 1: (A3.14)
It is straightforward to derive the following corresponding expressions for sector 2:





































(A3.16) replaces (4.14), (A3.17) replaces (4.15), and (A3.18) replaces (4.16). With fraction 2 of sector 1
output going to the production of good 2, the market equilibrium condition for good 1 is
(good 1) Nt qtc1t + 2Y2t = qtY1t: (A3.20)
The Detrended Dynamical System
With intermediate inputs, the trend XQt and XYt in (4.22) are now
XQt 
2
6 6 6 6 4g TFP
 1
1t (h1tEt) ˜  g TFP
1  ˜ 1
1  ˜ 2
2t (h2tEt)1  ˜ 1
3







2(1   ˜ 1)
(1   2)(1   ˜ 2)
; (A3.21)







A very tedious algebra shows that the same relation (A2.10) holds, provided that ˜ y1t and ˜ y2t are now
deﬁned as














t (1   sKt)
˜ 2 (1   sEt)1  ˜ 2: (A3.23)






˜ kt+1 = [1   t   (1   sKt)]˜ kt + (1    t)˜ y2t  
c2(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt





˜ t+1 =  ˜ t
(
1 + (1   t+1)
"
(1   2) ˜ 2
˜ y2;t+1
˜ kt+1(1   sK;t+1)
     t+1
#)
; (A3.25)
(market equilibrium for good 1)
˜ qtc1(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt
+ 2 ˜ y2 = ˜ qt ˜ y1t; (A3.26)
(equality of marginal products of capital) (1   1) ˜ 1
˜ qt ˜ y1t
˜ ktsKt
= (1   2) ˜ 2
˜ y2t






(1   1) ˜ 
˜ qt ˜ y1t
sEt




The Autonomous System and its Steady State
To study the asymptotic property of the autonomous system, in the rest of this Appendix, assume:





XYt ) and  t =  ,
(b) the demand functions c1 and c2 are those given in (5.2) and (5.3), reproduced here:












to 1, is autonomous. In this autonomous system, the path of XQt can be arbitrary (it does not have to be
a constant-growth-rate path, for example) simply because XQt does not enter the system. However, as
mentioned in the text, for the non-autonomous system exhibiting Engel’s law to asymptotically behave
like the autonomous system to be studied below, we need XYt=XQt to grow without limit.
58The steady-state (˜ k; ˜ ; ˜ q;sK;sE) of this dynamical system satisﬁes the following ﬁve equations that can
be obtained by dropping the time subscript in the system and by recalling that 
  XY;t+1=XYt:
n















1 + (1   )
"
(1   2) ˜ 2
˜ y2
(1   sK)˜ k
     
#)
; (A3.30)
1˜  + 2 ˜ y2 = ˜ q˜ y1; (A3.31)
(1   1) ˜ 1
˜ q˜ y1
sK˜ k
= (1   2) ˜ 2
˜ y2
(1   sK)˜ k
  ; (A3.32)
1 =
(1   1)˜ 
˜ q˜ y1
sE












E; ˜ y2 = ˜ q
 2
1 2 ˜ k2 (1   sK)2 (1   sE)1 2: (A3.34)
This ﬁve-equation system can be solved explicitly. For example, the closed-form expression for sK is
sK =
1    +

































is the steady-state gross pretax rate of return from capital.
Under the calibrated parameter values, the Jacobian of the mapping from (˜ kt; ˜ t) to (˜ kt+1; ˜ t+1) for the
dynamical system is numerically calculated and its engenvalues are (1.19, 0.87). So the steady state is a
saddle.
59Appendix 4: The Open Economy Version
This appendix describes the model obtained from opening up the model of Appendix 3 to trade in
goods and services.
The Detrended Dynamical System
If the country can exchange good 1 for good 2 at a given relative price of qt, the market equilibrium
conditionsforgood1andgood2canbecombinedintoone. Thismeansthat, inthedetrendeddynamical






˜ kt+1 = [1   t   (1   sKt)]˜ kt + (1    t)˜ y2t  
c2(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt
  1 ˜ qt ˜ y1t
+
"
˜ qt ˜ y1t  
˜ qtc1(˜ qtXQt; ˜ tXYt)
XYt=XQt




The additional term on the right side is net exports of good 1, valued in terms of good 2. This is the only
change; the dynamical system is made up of (A4.1), (A3.25), (A3.27), and (A3.28) with ˜ y1t and ˜ y2t still
given by (A3.23).
60Appendix 5: Aggregating Over Domestic and Foreign Capital
In this appendix, we show that the production function of sector 2, which is deﬁned over the total
capital stock (the sum of domestic and foreign capital) and labor, can be derived. For a particular
speciﬁcation of the rate of return from foreign capital and a Cobb-Douglas production function for
domestic output, we will also show that the derived production function is essentially Cobb-Douglas.
To simplify notation, we drop the time subscript throughout this appendix. As in the text, let K2 be
the total capital stock in sector 2 and L2 be labor input in the sector. The representative ﬁrm in sector 2
rents K2 units of capital from the household and divides them between foreign capital X and domestic
capital K2   X. The constant-returns-to-scale production function for domestic output is F2(K2   X;L2).
The rate of return from foreign capital depends on the ratio   X
K2. Write this schedule as (). It is
decreasing and convex function of .





X + F2(K2   X;L2): (A5.1)
The ﬁrst term is the return from investing in foreign capital and the second term is domestic production.
Clearly, this expression for revenue is a linearly homogeneous function of (K2;L2) after foreign capital X








F2 (K2   X;L2): (A5.2)
The expression for revenue can be rewritten as
[()k2 + f ((1   )k2)]L2; (A5.3)
wherek2 
K2
L2 . Thethatmaximizesthebracketedexpressiongivenk2 isafunctionofk2. Writeitas(k2).






By construction, this function H is linearly homogenous in (K2;L2). This is the production function
deﬁned over total capital K2 and L2.
To show that this derived production function H(K2;L2) can be approximately Cobb-Douglas, con-
sider the following functional forms:
F2(K2   X;L2) = A(K2   X)L1 
2 ; so f((1   )k2) = A(1   )k




Here, A, B, and  are parameters, and () is decreasing and concave, as required. Also, lim# 1 () = 1,
meaning that the ﬁrm can borrow from abroad only up to its domestic capital stock. If we deﬁne ¯ k so
that it satisﬁes A = B=(¯ k 1), then the optimal  when k2 = ¯ k is 0. Appendix Figures 2 and 3 graph (k2)
and h(k2) for B = 0:15, ¯ k = 2, and  = 0:338. Both axis of the graph of h(k2) are in the log scale, so the
near-linearity of the graph of h(k2) means that the function h(k2) is very close to the power function Ck
2.
The power  is the slope of the line, which is about 0:333.
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